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Poverty alleviation is one of the development priorities in Russia. The effective strategies of 
reducing poverty level in the country are a major concern of the government, international organiza­
tions, and academic researchers. The development of effective programs of fighting poverty re­
quires analysis of successes and failures of past policies. Our project shed light on poverty allevi­
ation programs in Russia by analysing the RLMS data for the period 1994-2005, covering both the 
period of deep socio-economic crisis and major economic resurgence.    
The methodology of the study is based on the decomposition approach to poverty and in­
equality, allowing to study the level and the structure of poverty in the context of different socio-
demographic types of households and different sources of households’ income. Income inequality is 
closely related to poverty, influencing its dynamics and responsiveness to economic growth. Hence, 
the analysis of poverty in the context of changing inequality levels allows us to derive important so­
cial policy implications.       
The objective of our study is to explain the changes in the structure of the Russian poverty in 
the period 1994 – 2005 in the context of the government policy of poverty alleviation. To meet the 
objectives of the study we have to: determine the contribution of income growth and income redis­
tribution for the poverty alleviation; determine the trend in the level, depth and severity of poverty 
for various socio-economic groups of households; decompose poverty according to various sources 
of  household disposable  income at  different  time periods,  in  order  to  estimate  their  impact  on 
poverty; assess the within and between groups (rich and poor) redistribution impact of government 
reforms in the area of poverty alleviation using the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by sources 
of income. 
Our general conclusions.
 The analysis of the structure and dynamics of poverty during the period 1994 – 2005 reveal 
low effectiveness of the government policy in the reduction of poverty and inequality.
 The government redistributive policies are effective neither for general population nor for 
specific socio-demographic groups.
 We find that benefits and transfers fail to reduce poverty among target groups.
 As a response to ineffective government social  policies households developed their own 




Alleviation of poverty is one of the primary objectives of Russian economic development. 
Effective strategies of poverty reduction are in the central focus of Russians government, interna­
tional organizations and academic community. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the poverty 
reduction programs it is necessary to analyze poverty development during a sufficient period of 
time. The analysis should capture not only the total number of people living in poverty but also fo­
cus on the specific socio-demographic groups which were more likely to experience poverty in dif­
ferent periods. Knowing poverty dynamics of a particular socio-demographic group allows us to de­
scribe changes in  the poverty profile  and thus  to  evaluate  the effectiveness  of  the government 
poverty reduction programs targeted to specific socio-demographic groups. 
It is also important to analyze the impact of various sources of income on poverty. The ana­
lysis allows assessing the relative importance of labour income, pensions, state subsidies, and intra 
family transfers at different points in time and to appraise the effects of the government initiatives 
in the labour market and the social sphere.
To understand the changing dynamics of poverty it is important to disentangle contributions 
of changes in the mean income from changes in redistribution of income. The influence of these 
two components at different points in time could have varying importance and possibly influence 
the poverty level in the opposite directions, often reflecting the impact of macroeconomic develop­
ments.
The transition period in Russia was characterized by the increased inequality among house­
hold in areas such as income, asset ownership, access to education and medical care. Undoubtedly, 
inequality is important for poverty. It affects the poverty dynamics and its responsiveness to eco­
nomic growth.
The focus of contemporary research has shifted from inequality to poverty research and con­
sequently a lot of attention is paid to the development of new poverty indexes. Many of these in­
dexes, such as Sen’s poverty index, are related to inequality indexes. Restricting the analysis to the 
poverty line may limit the insights into the effect of government policies on the level of poverty. 
Since cumulative distribution of income of rich and poor groups does not intersect, it is possible to 
decompose inequality into inequality within a population group and between groups. The decom­
position would provide the same information as calculation of poverty measures, but also give some 
extra evidence, useful in poverty analysis.  
Since 1992, Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (Rosstat) publishes information on the 
share of population with the monetary income below subsistence minimum. However this informa­
tion may not be enough to assess the level of poverty because the contribution of non monetary in­
come sources, such as income in kind and intra family transfers, has risen sharply. The necessity of 
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better understanding the effects of the government policy on poverty trends in Russia was one of 
the reasons for conducting household surveys such as the Russian Longitudinal and Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS). The RLMS dataset covers the period from 1994 to 2005 and allows to monitor and 
evaluate government social policy in the area of poverty alleviation1.
The objective of our study is to explain the changes in the structure of the Russian poverty in 
the period 1994 – 2005 in the context of the government policy of poverty alleviation. To meet the 
objectives of the study we have to:
- determine  the  contribution  of  income growth and income redistribution  for  the 
poverty alleviation;
- determine the trend in the level, depth and severity of poverty for various socio-
economic groups of households;
- decompose poverty according to various sources of household disposable income 
at different time periods, in order to estimate their impact on poverty;
- assess the within and between groups (rich and poor) redistribution impact of gov­
ernment reforms in the area of poverty alleviation using the decomposition of the 
Gini coefficient by sources of income. 
The literature dealing with the issues of poverty measurement is large and well- established. 
Ravallion (1999) presents a comprehensive overview of the literature on the issues related to pover­
ty measurement. The impact of aggregate welfare on poverty and inequality in Russia is investigat­
ed in Ovcharova and Tesliuc (2006). World Bank (2005) presents in-deph analysis of the Russians 
poverty trends including the regional poverty trends. Ovcharova (1998) presents estimates of the 
poverty line in Russia. Aivazyan and Kolenikov (2001) investigate inter-regional inequality using 
some innovative techniques. Sprieskov (2003) aims to explain incidence and duration of poverty in 
Russia using the ordered probit model. Finally, Kislisina (2003) presents a decomposition of in­
equality according to the sources of income and highlights the role of the household characteristics. 
In the analysis of poverty one of the most widely used indexes are FGT indexes (Foster et, 
al., 1984). These indexes allow additively decomposing poverty according to geographical and so­
cio-economic impacts. Recent studies presenting decomposition of Russian poverty using FGT in­
dexes  include  Gustafsson  and Nivorozhkina  (1996,  2004,  2005).  An overview of  different  ap­
proaches to decomposition of poverty and inequality is presented in Duclos and Araar (2005). 
The promotion of economic growth and redistribution polices are central to the reduction of 
poverty. Thus, the dynamics of poverty and its decomposition according to the impact of income 
growth and redistribution polices plays a critical role (Datt and Ravallion, 1992). However, the de­
1 In a context of a considered problem we understand the efficiency of state policy as productive reduction of poverty. 
At such approach this multidimensional concept can be characterised as economic or social, macroeconomic, group or 
individual efficiency.
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composition suggested by Datt and Ravallion (1992) as well as many others decomposition tech­
niques suffer from the presence of “indecomposable” error term. A solution to the problem is sug­
gested by Shorrocks (1999). The author uses Shapley value approach to achieve an exact decompo­
sition, in a sense that contributions to all factors sum up to the total change, and develop procedures 
for decomposition of the impact of income growth and inequality as well as contribution of various 
factors  to  poverty  change  over  time.  This  new  approach  to  decomposition  was  applied  by 
Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2001, 2005).  The authors decompose the intra-regional poverty in Rus­
sia into the contribution of income, inequality and regional price levels. 
Suggested decomposition methodology may be extended by applying methods of Yitzhaki 
(1985, 1990). The author extends Gini decomposition to account for the contribution of the sources 
of incomes. Yitzhaki (1985, 1990) decomposition would allow us to assess for the impact of poor 
on the overall inequality. 
1. Review of the macroeconomic trends in the context of social policy, 1994-2006
The start of economic reforms in Russia led to the significant decline in all sectors of the 
economy and lasted well throughout 1990s. An adverse effect of the reforms was increased uncer­
tainty of Russian households about the future. Privatisation and insolvency of state owned compan­
ies led to the rise in unemployment and deterioration of the social security system often provided by 
the employer. Wage arrears and unpaid leaves became a norm. Many individuals found their educa­
tion and skills outdated and of no use in the market environment. 
Subsequent period was characterised by the economic upheaval and improvement in living 
standards. Table 1 presents the main macro indicators for the period 1994-2006.
The GDP growth remained negative throughout the most of the 1990s. High levels of infla­
tion eradicated savings and negatively affected consumption. In 1997, the Russian economy showed 
some signs of recovery, which followed by the financial crisis of 1998 (Brown, 1999; Buchs, 1999), 
and subsequent economic upheaval. In 1999, the period of strong growth started and by 2000, the 
Russian economy reached a record 10% GDP growth rate. 
According to the official statistics, wage tends to be the main source of income, however 
from the beginning of reforms its contribution has declined by 2.5 times. Since the end of the 1990s 
the real wages were increasing, with the highest growth rate in the year 2000. During the period 
2001-2005 the growth rate of the real wage had slowed down. 
Increasing rates of unemployment in the period 1994-1999 could be attributed to the struc­
tural adjustments and financial crisis of 1998. Nevertheless unemployment rate remained high dur­
ing the period of economic recovery. 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators 1994 – 2006
Indicator Year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP (in percent­
ages to the previous 
year)
87,3 95,9 96,6 100,9 95,1 105,4 108,3 110,0 105,1 104,7 107,3 107,2 106,4
Consumer price 
index (in percent­
ages to the previous 
year)
320 230 121,8 111,0 184,4 136,5 120,0 119 115 112 111,7 110,9 109,0
Unemployment 
(at the end of year)
132 118 100 120 110 102 77,1 89,1 97,9 92,3 101,6 90,2 89,0
Annual average 
of employment 
(as % of total:
primary sector)
27,1 25,8 24,8 23 22,2 22,4 22,6 22,7 22,2 21,9 22,2 21,7 21,2
Agricultural sec­
tor 15,1 14,7 14 13,3 13,7 13,3 13 12,3 11,8 11 11,2 11,1 10,6
Service 42,7 43,9 44,6 47,8 48,6 48,7 48,6 49,0 50,1 50,8 54,1 54,4 55,2
Real income 
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2 In relation to the year 1991 the real income in 1994 amouted to 57.9%
3 In relation to previous year. 
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Figure 1. Gini coefficient for 1991 – 2004 (Russian official statistics)
An important indicator of the structural changes in Russia is employment level in different 
sectors of the economy. The employment dynamics is presented in Table 1. The period under in­
vestigation was characterised by the declining employment levels in production and agriculture and 
substantial increase in the service sector.
Economic transition also led to the decline in the individual wellbeing, individual consump­
tion decreased sharply, and inequality went up.  (Milanovic, 1998; World Bank 1995, 1998; Com­
mander et al, 1999). According to the official statistics the Gini index increased from 0.260 in 1991 
to 0.409 in 1994 (see Figure 1). At the later period the coefficient has declined but still remains high 
comparing to other European countries.
The risk of high inequality is related to the fact that people tend to associate income differ­
entials with social justice. Hence, the rise in income inequality has to be accompanied by improve­
ments in the welfare of the poor. From the point of view of social stability, the income and social 
protection policies should guarantee the income for the poor above the subsistence level. Only in 
this case, the increase in incomes of the wealthy will not be a factor contributing to social unrest.
Russian trends in the wellbeing of the socially deprived groups indicate that their position 
had deteriorated throughout most of the 1990s. The Russian system of social insurance failed to 
protect low income families. A number of important social security components were regarded as 
inadequate. For example, child benefits amounted to 3% of subsistence minimum in 2004. Table 2 
summarizes the most important government subsidies and guaranties for low income groups. 
It should be pointed out  that historically Russian social security system was not build to 
meet the demands of the disadvantaged households. The access to housing and high quality medical 
care was restricted to elites. Child benefits, maternity benefits and assistance to disabled people 
were not a government priority and often were insufficiently funded.   
From the begging of the 1990s, new types of benefits had emerged: unemployment benefits, 
benefits for low income families, assistance to the forced migrants from the republics of the former 
Soviet Union. As a result in the year 2000 federal budget financed around 150 social programs for 
over 200 eligible groups. On top of these social programs a number of benefits and subsidies were 
financed from independent funds, such as unemployment insurance. It should be noted that almost 
all benefits are administrated to specific groups and typically are not means-tested. Only three types 
of federally funded benefits are means-tested - child benefits, housing benefits and benefits to low 
income families. 
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Legislative base for administrating benefits is complex and is based on federal, regional and 
municipal laws. These documents often have contradictory meaning and are in constant process of 
revision. As a result, an overwhelming amount of benefits is received by relatively better-off house­
holds. In the middle of 1990s 70%4 of Russian population were eligible to state support. At the 
same time, due to the complicated procedure  and low level of benefits,  only 33.8%  of Russian 
households received state subsidies. Among households with income levels below the subsistence 
minimum only 27.4% received state support. According to the official statistics the size of benefits 
received by poor households was smaller comparing to the average household. Recent attempt to 
switch from in-kind transfers to monetary transfers did not improve the situation (Ovcharova et al., 
2005).
Table 2. The size of government subsidies and guaranties as a share of subsistence minimum
(as of January 1, each year)
Indicator Year1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Minimum wage 28,0 10,0 16 19 18 10 6,8 13,2 16,1 20,2 24,0
Minimum pension 44 27 26 25 29 15 15,3 15,8 34,35 33,6 34,2
Maternity benefits 23,7 20,8 40,1 40,6 33,9 18,4 14,1 14,2 29,0 24,5 22,1
Child benefit6 2118
8
7 13 15 14 7 5,0 5,0 4,1 3,4 3,1
Minimum unemployment 
benefits 20,3 16,1 19,7 20,3 16,9 8,3 - 6,6 5,4 4,5 4,0
Minimum stipend:
Student, high education 28 10 16 38 36 19 13,6 13,2 10,7 9,0 16,0
Student, secondary educa­
tion 19 7 11 13 13 7 4,7 4,6 3,8 3,1 5,6
Source: Social'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naselenija Rossii: Stat. sb. / Goskomstat Rossii. - M.,(sborniki s 1995 
po 2005 gg).
One of the outcomes of economic recovery at the end of 1990s was better funding of social 
programs. Nevertheless the share of social spending in the federal budget remains relatively low, 
reaching 8.8% of the GDP in 2005.7 
Pension benefits  are the main social  program administrated by the Russian government. 
Price liberalization of 1992 lead to the two-fold reduction in the real value of pensions8. As com­
pensation, the government introduced minimum income pension, which was equal to 342 rubles. It 
was assumed that the size of the pension will be revised periodically. Subsequent revisions attempt­
ed to keep the size of the average pension at the subsistence minimum level. 
4 Government programme «Strukturnaja perestrojka i economicheskiy rost v 1997-2000 godah».
5 Prior to 2003 the pensions are reported without accounting for compensations, after 2003 reported pensions include 
only part related to the labor income.
6 1994 – 1995 the size of child benefits was differentiated according to the age of the child. Upper line presents the ben­
efits for children up to 6 years old and lower line the size of benefits for 6-16 years old.
7 Social'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naselenija v Rossii. – M.: Rosstat, 2006.
8 Organizacija socialnogo obespechenija: pensionnoe obespechenie. M., Ministerstvo socialnoj zashchiti naselenija RF, 
1993.
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Deterioration of macroeconomic situation in 1994-1995 led to decline of average pensions 
below the subsistence minimum, with the minimum pension dropping below 50% of the subsistence 
minimum. The indexation that followed increased pensions, but also lead to the deficit in the pen­
sion fund. 
In 1996-1998 due to the lack of financing and wage arrears the pension crisis had deepened. 
Proposals of reforming the pension system were overturned multiple times. The rapid process of 
ageing of the Russian population and financial crisis of 1998 added urgency to the need of the pen­
sion system reform.9 At the beginning of 2002, the average pension became equal to the subsistence 
minimum. However, real pensions still accounted to only 66.4% of their pre reform period.   
Economic stabilization led to increase in real incomes. Wages and pensions grew at the ac­
celerating rate, exceeding the rate of the GDP growth. The share of households with incomes below 
subsistence minimum declined10.






























poverty level, in % from total population
deficiency of the cash income, in % from the total cash incomes of the population
Figure 2. Official estimates of the level and extend of poverty
9 Predlozhenija k strategii sodejstvija i sokrawenija bednosti v Rossii. Izdanie bjuro MOT. Moskva 2002.
10  Source: Obzor social'noj politiki v Rossii. Nachalo 2000-h/pod red. T.M.Malevoj/ N.V.Zubarevich, D.H.Ibragimova 
i dr.; Nezavisimyj institut social'noj politiki. – M.: NISP, 2007.
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Source: Rossija v cifrah. 2004: Krat. stat. sb./ Federal'naja sluzhba gosudarstvennoj statistiki. - M., 2004. - S. 99-100. 
Social'noe polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naselenija Rossii: Stat. sb. / Goskomstat Rossii. - M., 2005. - S. 24. Social'noe 
polozhenie i uroven' zhizni naselenija Rossii: Stat. sb. / Goskomstat Rossii. - M., 1997. - S. 9
In the period 1992-1994 the proportion of individuals living below the poverty line, defined 
by the state, was decreasing. This however can be partially attributed to the changes in methodology 
of the statistical agency rather than real improvements in the wellbeing. The trend in the poverty al­
leviation was brooked abruptly by the financial crisis of 1998. The next significant decline in pover­
ty levels started in the year 2000. However, the true decline is masked due to adoption of more “ex­
pensive” survival equivalent. Starting from 2001 we observe steady decline in poverty levels, which 
point to the positive impact of economic development on income growth. (Ovcharova, 2005, 2007). 
According to (Ovcharova, 2007) the income deficit of poor households remained relatively stable at 
the level of 31%.
2. Methodology
2.1. Data 
We utilise the information provided by ten rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS) for the period 1994-2005. RLMS dataset provides socio-demographic information 
and information on individual and household incomes and consumption. 
The object of our study is a household. In the household we identify the household head – an 
individual with the highest income. For each household we take into the account the following char­
acteristics: size and structure of the household, number of children and working members and type 
of settlement. We also take into the account attributes of the head of the household, such as: age, 
gender, education, employment status as well as professional occupation. For the purpose of decom­
position we treat each household member as a separate observation, thus avoiding the problem that 
households with different number of individuals would have the same weight in the sample (table 
3). 
We construct a measure of household disposable income as a welfare indicator. Household 
disposable income includes both information provided by the individual questionnaire and house­
hold questionnaire. We adjust the disposable income to account for non monetary sources of in­
come.
The sources of income which were included into the calculation of disposable income are:
1. Wage and income in-kind:  Includes monetary and non monetary labour income from 
primary and secondary employment11.  
2. Pensions.
11 The RLMS questionnaire contains questions asking households to estimate a monetary equivalent of  their non-mon­





6. Benefits: including unemployment benefits and house heating assistance.
7. Other forms of assistance: intra family transfers, charity,  etc. Starting from the year 
2000 this includes government help with the exception of pensions and child benefits. 
8. Income from selling the property or house leasing
9. Income from subsidiary agriculture. 
10. Other forms of income: royalties, interest, loans, etc.
Households which did not report any of the above mentioned sources of income are ex­
cluded from the analysis.12 
Table 3
Sample size
Year The share of income expenditures, %
Number of observations 
(households) Number of individuals
1994 71,2 3881 11027
1995 69,6 3783 10161
1996 77,4 3680 9095
1998 77,9 3704 9715
2000 77,1 4006 10986
2001 77,7 4528 12259
2002 82,3 4668 12635
2003 93,8 4718 12755
2004 98 4711 12882
2005 98,9 4572 12383
Mean 82 4225 11390
We consider the household to be poor if its disposable income is less than 50% of the medi­
an disposable per capita income of the households in our sample. Such approach is not free of short­
comings, but it allows as to analyse the poverty trends using consistent definition of poverty. 
2.2. Decomposition approach 
A popular class of poverty indexes which posses a number of useful properties and allow ad­
ditive decomposition is FGT indexes (Foster, et al., 1984). In general form the index can be written 
as follows:
12 Classification of income and expenditures changes among waves.
The main changes in accounting for income and expenditures include: 
− until 2002 child subsidies for children younger than 1.5 years were not accounted separately.
− untl 2001 information of housing subsidies was not colleted.
− information for monetary value of transfers and subsudies is  only avaliable for 2005.
− until 1998 there is no information on overdue housing bills, expenditures on hospital treatment and dental care. In­
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there  Yi – personal income,  N – sample size,  n – number of individuals below poverty line,  Z – 
poverty line.
When α=0 – index represents the proportion of a population in poverty; α=1 – is an estimate 
(in % from poverty line) of the average shortfall of individual income from the poverty line; α≥2 – 
index gives higher weight to a large shortfall of individual income.
FGT index is a useful tool for building of a poverty profile. Let the population be divided 
into  m mutually exclusive population subgroups forming poverty profile. The poverty profile is 
simply the list of poverty measures Pj for j=1,2,...m. Aggregate poverty can be written as the popu­














P p Z Y
n =
= е
is the poverty measure for j’th sub-group with population nj, having income Yij for i=1,2,...nj and the 
total population is N=Σnj . The p(Zj,Yij) is the individual poverty measure, taking value zero for non-
poor (Yij<Zj) and some positive number for poor. 
Subgroup decomposability also implies that an income improvement in one of the subgroups 
will necessary improve aggregate poverty if the incomes in other subgroups have not changed (Fos­
ter et al., 1984).
In the context of poverty research decomposition techniques allow to distinguish intra group 
effect arising due to the income  differences between subgroups (e.g.  males/females) from inter 
group effects arising due to the distribution of income within groups.
The growth-redistribution decomposition methodology was suggested by Datt and Ravallion 
(1992). According to the authors decomposition of the change in poverty between periods t1 and t2 
(P2–P1) accounting for the impact of income growth (difference in mean income), redistribution 
component (difference in relative income shares) and error term which depends on interdependence 
of growth and redistributive policies is given by the formula: 
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2
2 1 [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )]t t t t t t t t
C C
P P P P P P R− = µ pi − µ pi + µ pi − µ pi +
14444244443 14444244443 , for t1,
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
1 2
2 1 [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )]t t t t t t t t
C C
P P P P P P R− = µ pi − µ pi + µ pi − µ pi +
14444244443 14444244443 , for t2,
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there (P2−P1) – difference in poverty between t1 and t2, С1 – growth impact, С2 – contribution of re­
distribution effect,  R – indecomposable error term (residual),  2 1( , )t tP µ pi  – FGT index of the first 
period when we multiply all incomes 1tiY of the first period by the ratio 2 1/t tµ µ . 1 2( , )t tP µ pi  – FGT 
index of the second period we multiply all incomes 2tiY  of the second period by the ratio 1 2/t tµ µ 13.
Using the Shapley values the exact FGT decomposition of the impact of growth and redistri­
bution (free from error term) is given by the following formula:
( )
( )
2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
1
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
2
2 1
1 [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )]
2
1 [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )] .
2
t t t t t t t t
C
t t t t t t t t
C
P P P P P P
P P P P
− = µ pi − µ pi + µ pi − µ pi +
+ µ pi − µ pi + µ pi − µ pi
14444444444244444444443
14444444444244444444443
The next task of the proposed exercise is to take into the account that individual income 








= е  and to identify impact of every components on overall poverty. One supposes with the 
Shapley approach that the contribution of component j towards reducing total poverty is the expec­
ted value of its marginal contribution when it is added randomly to anyone of the various subsets 
of components that one can choose from the set of all components. 
The contribution of all factors yields an exact, additive decomposition of Yi into J compon­
ents. When a component is missing from that set, we assume that the observation values of that 
component are everywhere replaced by 0  (Duclos and Araar, 2003).
Decomposition approach developed by (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985), allows us to examine 
the impact of the different sources of income on inequality. Let’s define overall household per cap­
ita income as  y . Cumulative distribution function of the income  −  ( )yF  takes values 0 for the 
poorest household and 1 for the richest. Let us also define average income as y . The Gini coeffi­
cient can be decomposed in the following way: 
( )2cov , /y i i i
i
G y F y y S R G= =й щл ы е
,
13 Here we denote μt1 mean income for the period t1, μt2 – mean income for the period t2, πt1 – ratio 2 1/t tµ µ , πt2 – ratio 
1 2
/t tµ µ . 
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where yG  denotes the Gini coefficient of total income, iG  is the Gini index of the income compon­
ent i , iS  is a component i’s share of total income. Finally, iR  is the “Gini correlation” between in­
come component i  and total income. 
The Gini correlation is defined as  ( ) ( )cov , / cov ,i i i iR y F y y F y= й щ й щл ы л ы, where  ( )iF y  is a 
function of cumulative distribution of income component i. The Gini correlation Ri ranges between 
-1 and +1. Income from sources such as income from capital that tend to be strongly and positively 
correlated with total income and thus would exhibit strong and positive Gini correlation. Income 
from benefits and transfers tend to have smaller and possibly negative Gini correlation. The overall 
(absolute) contribution of income component i in total income inequality is given by i i iS R G .
A key rationale for studying decomposition by source is to learn how changes in particular 
income source will affect overall income inequality. This decomposition provides a simple way to 
assess the impact on the inequality in total income of a marginal percentage change equal for all 
households in the income from a particular source. Yitzhaki (1986) showed that the impact for all 
households of the increase in income source i can be derived by multiplying iy  by ( )1 ie+ , where ie  
approaches to zero, so that 
( ) .y i i i y
i
G





This equation can be rewritten to show that the percentage change in inequality due to a 
marginal percentage change in the income from source i is equal to that source’s contribution to the 
Gini minus its contribution to the total income. In other words, at the margin, what matters for eval­
uating the redistributive impact of income sources is not their Gini, but rather the product   i iR G , 
which is called the pseudo Gini. Alternatively, denoting by /i i i yR G Gη =  the so called Gini income 
elasticity (GIE) for source i, the marginal impact for households on the Gini for total income in per­
centage term is 
( )/ 1 .y i i i i i i i
y y




= − = −
Thus a percentage increase in the income from a source with a GIE ηi smaller (lager) than 
one will decrease (increase) the inequality in per capita income. The lower the GIE, the larger the 










η = Ч ,
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where xi is income source i per capita, y − is income per capita, and Si is the share of source i in in­
come. 
Next decomposition presents an algebraic decomposition of the Gini index, an approach that 
will be used later for evaluating the impact of policy instruments on the Gini index and its compon­
ents.
Assume that society is divided into two administrative groups: 
− the poor, whose income is y ≤ Z (Z is the poverty line)
− the rich, whose income is y > Z. 
The Gini coefficient of income y, yoG  is composed of:
b
yo p yp yp r yr yrG P S G P S G G= + + ,
where yiG  denotes the Gini coefficient of income, y, and i = (o − overall; p − poor; r − rich), Pi is 
the share of the group in the population; 0/yi i iS P y y=  is group i’s share in total income, y, and oy  
denote mean income. bG  is between-groups inequality.
Note that 1yr ypS S= −  and 1r pP P= − . (To simplify the notation - the index y is omitted un­
less it  is necessary to avoid confusion). Also  b p ypG P S= − ,  this means that between-groups in­
equality is equal to the share of the poor in the population minus their share in income. bG  is an in­
creasing (decreasing) function of  the poverty line, depending on whether ( ) oZ y< > . Hence, for all 
practical purposes  pG  is an increasing function of the poverty line. This result should be treated 
with caution because an increase of inequality among the poor and an increase in between-groups 
inequality may simply be the result of (unintentionally) raising the poverty line.
Finally, the impact of a policy measure on inequality is a function of its effect on each com­
ponent, weighted by the component’s share in income inequality.


















where wi is the share of this component in the Gini coefficient. From equations it clearly follows 
that 1bp rw w w+ + = .
According to Yitzhaki (2002) having decomposed the numerator, the decomposition of the 
overall income elasticity is straightforward. Using the definition of income elasticity mentioned 
above we get: 
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p p b br r
o p r
o o
w S w S w
S S
η = η + η + η .
This equation presents the overall Gini income elasticity as a weighted sum of intra- and in­
ter-group elasticities. Note that each income elasticity has the same implication on the appropriate 
Gini inequality component as the overall elasticity: for example, if ηp > 1, then an increase in the i 
source of income increased Gini inequality among the poor. 
3. Decomposition of the dynamics and structure of Russian poverty
3.1. Poverty profiles: FGT decomposition
Our results based on the RLMS dataset are somewhat different from the results reported 
earlier (figure 2). This could be explained by the fact that the poverty line used in the analysis in­
cludes less poor individuals comparing to the poverty line which is based on the subsistence equi­
valent. Moreover, our income definition is wider comparing to the official one and is consistent 
over time.
Relative poverty line rises in the beginning of the investigation period and reaches the pick 
in 1996-1998. After 1998 the poverty level starts to decline at an increasing rate. The proportion of 
poor individuals went up from 17.9% in 1994 to 20.1% in 1998, when it declined to 15.4% in the 
year 2005. Income deficit reached its pick in 1996 and 2001 and went down to 1.8% in 2004.
The effectiveness of the government social policy could be viewed by its success to help the 
groups with high poverty risk to escape poverty or to reduce its incidence and severity. The devel­
opment of poverty trends often vary among subgroups. The impact on aggregate poverty of each 
subgroup depends on its size as well as incidence and deepness of poverty in each subgroup. 
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Figure 3. Estimates of the level and extend of poverty, RLMS data 
(the poverty line − 50 % median disposable per capita income)
The poverty profile in Russia varies depending on the residence area (figure 4). During the 
period under investigation the highest levels of poverty were found in the rural area. Even account­
ing for income in kind the level of poverty in rural areas was three times higher comparing to re­
gional centres.
The level of poverty in rural area went up from 0.317 in 1994 to 0.345 in 1996 and picked in 
2001 reaching 0.362. After the year 2001 poverty levels in rural area started to decline reaching the 
level of 0.281.
The share of rural population went down in the middle of 1990th and then bounce back to 
0,265 in 2005. 
As a result the rural poverty had a large impact on the aggregate poverty. During the period 
under investigation the relative contribution of rural poverty to the aggregate poverty went up from 
0.421 to 0.484. 
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The poverty level in the urban-type settlement (posyolok gorodskogo tipa) exhibited a vary­
ing trend. However, due to the small proportion of individuals living in such areas the contribution 
on aggregate poverty remained small.
The poverty level in towns remained consistently higher than in cities with the exception of 
the year 2001.Te absolute contribution of urban poverty to aggregate poverty reached its pick in the 
year 1996 and remained persistently high until 2001 when it dropped sharply. Initial increase in the 
impact of urban poverty on aggregate poverty may be explained by the prevalence of wage arrears 
in the middle of 1990th.
 The relative contribution of cities to aggregate poverty went down from 0.258 in 1994 to 
0.198 in 2005, while the contribution of towns decreased only slightly from 0.252 to 0.246.
The urban-rural poverty gap remained stable during the whole period. However diverging 
social-demographic trends led to the increase in the gap in the contribution to poverty between rural 
and urban areas. The gap was smallest in 1996 and increased dramatically afterwards.
The analysis of the FGT index for α=1 и α=2 showed that the relative contribution of in­
come deficit in rural areas and urban-type settlements did not change much, but the values were 
higher comparing to results found for α=0, at the same time results for urban areas indicate opposite 
relationship. This indicates that poverty in rural areas was deeper and more severe. Since 2004, in 
cities the share of poor declined, but the deepness and severity of poverty increased. This phe­
nomenon can be explained by the growth of income of individuals who were just below the poverty 
line, while marginalized groups remained unaffected. 
To a large extend the gap between rural and urban areas in poverty profiles may be ex­
plained by socio-demographic structure. Thus, it is warranted to present decomposition according to 
the socio-demographic type of the household.
The following decomposition is conducted by the type of households. The statistical analysis 
of different type of households supports a stylized fact that the most poor are the single parent 
households, the poverty level in that group increased from 22.1% to 27.3% in 2005. The share of 
these households though is relatively small and remained stable – about 4.5% of total number of 
households. The second poorest group is married couples with children, and the households with 
several generations of relatives. The poverty in this group has been decreasing during the period of 
investigation, but the share of households with two children was decreasing, while the share of 
“multigenerational” households was increasing.           
There are several explanations for the observed phenomena. Despite the growth in nominal 
incomes,  the  living  standards  of  Russian  households  remain  relatively  low.  One  of  the  con­
sequences of low living standard is the fact that young families are often reside with their parents 
due to lack of funds for purchasing or renting their own housing. In the presence of two able-bodied 
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couples in a household, even the presence of children is unlikely to decrease the per capita incomes 
below the poverty level. In other cases, a retired female member of household often takes care of 
children while the mother can continue to work.14          
Moreover, in the period from 1996 to 1998, characterized by the presence of wage areas and 
high unemployment,  pensioners were often the main source of income in the multigenerational 
households. This observation is indirectly supported by the fact that during the 1998 financial crisis, 
the contribution to poverty and its extent decreased in multigenerational households but increased 
for the couples with children. After 1998, the contribution to poverty of the couples with children 
decreased while the contribution of other types of households remained relatively constant. From 
our perspective, these facts indicate that the diversification of resources allows multigenerational 
households  optimize  consumption  and decrease  the  risk  and extent  of  poverty.  Single-member 
households, and couples without children were less prone to poverty. The level of poverty in these 
households is up to four times lower than in other groups, while their share remained relatively 
stable.     
Our results confirm the findings of (Ovcharova and Popova, 2005) on the fact that child 
poverty is acute problem of the Russian society. Limited progress achieved in this sphere may 
rather be attributed to the decreasing fertility rate rather than susses of the government policy. Sus­
tainable fertility rate is a cornerstone of the long-term economic development. The situation when 
households postpone childbearing due to the financial issues will results in the labour deficit in the 
nearest future. We do not claim that the decrease in fertility can be fully explained by the listed 
factors, but the fact that these factors are important is undisputable.



















































Figure 4. Decomposition according to the area of residence
a) index  FGT (α=0),  b) proportion of individuals, c) absolute contribution to poverty (α=0)
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During the period under investigation we observe a substantial increase in the number of 
households without children and households with one child. The share of households with two chil­
dren has exhibited a significant decrease while the proportion of the households with three and 
more children has decrease only marginally.
The poverty index clearly indicates an increase in poverty with an increase in the number of 
children in household (see Figure 6). Moreover, the economic downturn is closely correlated with 
the increase in poverty of households with two or more children. Only in 2005, the poverty in this 
group decreased while the poverty in other groups remained at the level of 1994.    
The level of poverty for the household with one child went up from 16.3% in 1994 to 20.7% 
in the year 2000. Between the year 2000 and 2005 we observe the decrease in poverty rate to 
13.8%. At the same time the share of households with one child increased from 31.3% to 34.8%. It 
is also interesting to note that the contribution to aggregate poverty of the households with one child 
was smaller when that of households with two children from 1994 to 1999. However, after 1999 the 
contribution to aggregate poverty of the households with one child started to increase and exceeded 
the contribution of the households with two children.
The share of poor rose among households with two children during the economic crisis of 
1998 and went back to the level of 24.3% in 2005. The level of poverty for the households with 
three or more children increased from 36.2% to 48% in the period 1994-2001 and then declined to 
28.5% in 2005.  
In the period prior to 1998 the largest contribution in aggregate poverty had households with 
two children. However, as the number of such household declined, the contribution to aggregate 
poverty of household with one child and childless household increased. The impact of single parent 
household on aggregate poverty is the smallest. Their contribution declined from 7.2% in 1994 to 
5.1% in 2005.
Deepness and severity of poverty developed similar to the level of poverty in all groups. 
However, for households with two and more children the relative impact on aggregate poverty is 
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c) 
Figure 5. Decomposition according to the household type
a) index  FGT (α=0),  b) proportion of individuals, c) absolute contribution to poverty (α=0)
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Do we observe an effect of the government social policy on the poverty levels of households 
with children? 
When we examined Russian macroeconomic trends we pointed out relatively small level of 
child  and maternity  transfers  during the period of investigation.  Nevertheless,  on the aggregate 
level, these transfers could still affect the poverty trends of households with children. According to 
official statistics, the real growth of child and maternity transfers amounted to 4.8% in 2000, 7.4% 
in 2001, 9.5% in 2002, -7.5% in 2003, and -11.2% in 2004.15 
This trend does not correlate with the poverty levels of households with children, indicating 
the lack of effect of these transfers on poverty levels of targeted groups. 
The primary reason for the child poverty lays in the fact that after the birth of the child 
mother interrupt work for several years or goes into part-time employment.Households with one 
employed member had a high risk of being poor. In 1994 their share was 0.216, it increased to 
0.237 in 1996 than declined again to the level of 1994 and stabilised at the level 0.224 in 2005. 
The lowest incidences of poverty are among households with three members employed, it is 
somewhat higher in households with two working members. However both groups exhibited declin­
ing risk of poverty after 1998. Before 2001 the risk of poverty for households consisting of non-em­
ployed members was smaller than that of households with one working member. By the end of the 
study period the poverty risk was the same for both groups.  
The later finding can be explained by the fact that households where all members are non-
employed are usually pensioners’ households, while households with one employed member pre­
dominantly consist of employed male, housewife and small children. During the 1990s, the pension 
benefits provided low but stable standards of living allowing pensioners to be better off than house­
holds with one employed member. Starting from 2000 the rate of wage growth exceeded that of 
pensions. Households with one employed member are no longer poorer than households where all 
members are non-employed. From the graph we observe that the poverty level falls with the number 
of working members in the household. 
We observe the spike in poverty level, its depth and severity among households with em­
ployed members during the years 1996 – 1998. These were the years of high wage arrears and fin­
ancial crisis.













































Three and more children
c) 
Figure 6. Decomposition according to the number of children in the household 
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Figure 7. Decomposition according to the number of working members
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Figure 8. Decomposition according to gender of household head
a) index  FGT (α=0),  b) proportion of individuals, c) absolute contribution to poverty (α=0)
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During the period under investigation we observe a slow increase in families with more than 
three employed members. However the share of households with one employed member is much 
larger and more stable. It is also interesting to compare households; where all members are non-em­
ployed to households where two members are employed. The increase in the number of households 
with two working members was absolutely symmetrical to the decline in the number of households 
where all members are non-employed. Pension arrears and declining living standard made pension­
ers to look for a job. After the 2000 we observe parallel trends in the proportions of these house­
holds and strong divergence in the year 2005.
The households with one employed member have the highest contribution to the aggregate 
poverty. Commonly these are the households consisting of the relatively young individuals with 
children. However the depth and severity of poverty in this group is close to the other groups. 
Households with two employed members also have a high contribution to the aggregate poverty. 
The impact of this group tends to diminish over time. Moreover the depth and severity of poverty 
tend to decrease faster among households with two employed members. The smallest contribution 
to the aggregate poverty had households with more than three employed members. Finally, house­
holds where none of the members are employed tend to increase their impact on poverty. The depth 
and severity of poverty in this group tend to increase faster comparing to the number of poor. 
How did poverty changes depend on the characteristics of the household head? The level of 
poverty for households where the household head is a female is substantially higher than of house­
holds headed by a male. 
The raise in poverty among households headed by males in 1995-1996 can be explained by 
the fact that males were predominantly employed in industries which underwent substantial restruc­
turing. It should be noted that starting from the year 2001 we observe a decline in the poverty levels 
of households headed by males. At the same time poverty among female headed households re­
mained rather stable. 
The trends in the change of the FGT index if α =1 и α=2 are close to results presented at the 
Figure 8. 
How did the level of human capital influence the level of poverty in the period under invest­
igation?  Our results indicate that the level of poverty goes down with the increase in education of 
the household head. The risk of falling into poverty for households with different education level 
varied under the period of investigation (Fig. 9). 
The number of household heads with post secondary education went up from 20.9% in 1994 
to 22.6% in 2005 at the same time the level of poverty for this group went up from 6% in 1994 to 
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Figure 9. Decomposition according to education of household head
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Figure 10. Decomposition according to age of household head
a) index  FGT (α=0),  b) proportion of individuals, c) absolute contribution to poverty (α=0)
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The share of households, where the head had a professional secondary degree remained un­
changed during the period under investigation. The level of poverty for this group also remained 
stable. The level of poverty went up to 18.9% in 1996 - 2000 and decreased hereafter. By the end of 
our observation period it was still higher comparing to 1994. 
The poverty peake for the households where the head had a secondary degree was also in 
1996 – 1998. However, by the end of our study period the level of poverty for this group declined 
from 18.9% in 1994 to 16.4% in 2005. 
Households with the head who had primary professional or high school education had the 
most pronounced decrease in poverty rate. The level of poverty for this group went down from 
19.9% to 11.9% during the period under investigation. The number of such households had some­
what increased.
Households with heads with primary or professional secondary education contribute to ag­
gregate poverty equally. Yet there exists some important differences. The poverty rate is higher for 
household there the head has primary professional education. However the share of these house­
holds is smaller. Starting from 2002 the impact on aggregate poverty is higher among individuals 
with general secondary education, due to the poverty increase among these households.
The highest impact on poverty is from households where the household head education does 
not exceed primary school. Their impact on the aggregate poverty had decreased over the period un­
der  investigation,  but  still  remained  high.  The  reduction  of  impact  on  aggregate  poverty  was 
achieved due to reduction in the share of such households from 26.2% to 18% as well as poverty re­
duction from 28% to 23.6%.
It is also evident from our analysis that the gap in the contribution to aggregate poverty of 
different educational type households had decreased over time.
In 1994 the lowest poverty rate was among households headed by the individual aged 45 – 
59. Similar, but somewhat higher rates were among households headed by 25 – 44 year olds. The 
poorest households were headed by the pensioners.
The impact on aggregate poverty of these groups of the households depends crucially on the 
changes in the demographic structure over time. 
The share of household heads younger than 25 had a small decrease. However, the poverty 
rate among this group is persistently high. As a result the impact of this group on the aggregate 
poverty remained stable and went down only by the end of the period under investigation. 
The share of households headed by the 25 – 49 year olds was decreasing throughout the ana­
lysing period and the share of households headed by the 25 – 59 year olds increased. Starting from 
1996 to 1998 we observe poverty increase in the households headed by the able-bodied individuals, 
especially those that are young. Poverty rate among pensioners went down.
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Since the year 2000 we observe decrease in the poverty level among households with young 
heads and increase in poverty among households with older heads.
The contribution to poverty of the households with the able-bodied heads went up during 
1996 – 1998. A striking feature of this period is that the contribution of the former group of the 
households exceeds that of households headed by the pensioners. 
The results of our analysis indicate that the relative impact of the FGT index for α=1 and 
α=2 is higher than for α=0 for households headed by the individuals yonder than 45 and older than 
65. The poverty is less severity for households with the heads aged 45 – 59. After the 1996 the im­
pact of poverty was less pronounced for the households with heads aged 60 – 65. 
3.2. FGT decomposition of the growth and redistribution effects
According to the (Ravallion, Datt 1992) the change in poverty between two periods can be 
presented as the sum of two components, growth and redistribution between two periods t1 and t2.
The growth component captures the change in the average level of income under the as­
sumption that the redistribution did not change between two periods. The redistribution component 
captures the effect of the change in the redistribution between two periods, conditioned on the fact 
that  the  average income remained unchanged.  Finally,  the  error  term captures  the  interrelation 
between two components. 
For the purpose of our analysis we are interested in the effect of redistribution, thus we use 
FGT for α=2. However, for illustrative purposes we present in Table 1 (appendix 2) the contribution 
of growth and redistribution using all three components. It is clear from Table 1 that the growth 
component is always negative. This indicates that growth decreased relative poverty. Moreover, the 
absolute impact of growth rises over time16. 
The analysis of the redistribution effect indicate that during the periods 1995-1996, 2000-
2001 and 2002-2003 the process of redistribution led to the increase in poverty. 
It should be noted however that the impact of the growth effect greatly exceeds that of redis­
tribution effect. Thus, redistribution processes had smaller role in poverty alleviation.
The error term which captures the interrelation between growth and redistribution was neg­
ative only for the period 1996 – 2002.
The estimation using Shapley method did not influence our results with the exception that 
we find negative impact of redistribution on poverty during 1994-1995.
3.3. The dynamics of the household disposable per capita income 
16 It should be noted that the growth effect captures the change in the nominal income which was espesially high due to 
the inflation in the begining of the 1990s. 
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Before presenting the results of the poverty decomposition according to the sources of in­
come we review the relative contribution of different sources of income into the overall disposable 
income of the household. Wage is the main source of income for both poor and non-poor house­
holds. However, the share and dynamics of wage differ in two groups (table 4, appendix 3). 
Among poor households the share of wage in the household disposable income was equal to 
0.47 in 1995 then the share went up to 0.6 in 1996 and decreased again to 0.5 in 2000 reaching 0.54 
in 2004. 
Among non-poor households the share of wage in the household disposable income was 
0.59 in 1994 and decreased to 0.52 in 1998 and went up to 0.64 in 2005.
The pick of wage arrears in 1996 increased poverty among employed households. As a res­
ult the share of wage in the disposable income reached its maximum and the share of pensions went 
down from 0.34 in 1994 to 0.22 in 1996. The subsequent growth of pensions raised its share in the 
disposable income to 0.32. 
The share of  pensions in  the disposable  income of non-poor households went  gradually 
down from 0.16 in 1994 to 0.13 in 2004.
The share of other income components did not exceed 0.1 among poor households and 0.2 
among non-poor households. Nevertheless, at different points in time these components played an 
important role. 
For example in 1998 the share of income for poor households that originates from interest 
payments, insurance premiums, loans, etc. grew from 0.05 to 0.07 of the household disposable in­
come and decreased hereafter to 0.02 in 2005. At the same time for non-poor households this share 
was equal to 0.13 in 1994 and decreased to 0.08 in 2002, rising again to its initial value in 2004.
The share of income from leasing or selling the property is negligibly small for poor house­
holds and is more important for non-poor households. At the time of financial crisis the share of in­
come from property leasing in the overall disposable income went up from 0.03 in 1994 to 0.1 in 
1998. During the period 2000 – 2001 it went down again to 0.03 and increased to 0.06 in 2003 – 
2004. Finally by the end of our observation period the share was equal to 0.01. 
The income from subsidiary agriculture have similar dynamics to income from property 
leasing but more important for non-poor households. The highest share of income from the subsidi­
ary agriculture in the total disposable household income was in 2000 – 2001 amounting to 0.03 for 
poor and 0.07 for non-poor households. 
Government benefits and subsidies account for a very small share of households’ disposable 
income. However the share is higher for poor households. The relative important of benefits re­
mained stable for non-poor households and varied over time for poor households.
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The share of child benefits in the disposable income of non-poor households decreased from 
0.009 in 1998 to 0.004 in 2005. The share of child benefits in the household’s disposable income of 
poor households went down from 0.06 in 1994 to 0.03 in 1998 and further decreased to 0.02 in 
2005.
The share of unemployment benefits and heating subsidies in the household disposable in­
come grew from 0.006 in 1994 to 0.041 in 2005 for poor households and from 0.004 to 0.022 for 
non-poor households.
The other forms of assistance includes: interfamily transfers, charity, and starting from 2000 
government benefits and subsidies excluding pensions and child benefits. For poor households the 
share of other income sources in the household disposable income increased in the period 1994 – 
2000 from 0.023 to 0.043 and decreased to 0.032 in 2005. For non-poor households the share of this 
component was 0.044 in 1994 and decreased by 2005 to 0.035. 
The share of alimony and stipends was negligible for both groups of households.
According to our results wage and pensions had the largest shares in the household dispos­
able income. However, for poor households we observe that pensions have higher share in house­
hold disposable income comparing to non-poor households. 
The other forms of income play a smaller role in the household’s disposable income. More 
important, we do not find differences in distribution of the other forms of income between poor and 
non-poor households. 
3.4. Decomposition of the FGT index by income sources









= е such as: wage from primary and secondary employment, transfers, etc. to the 
overall poverty.
Among Russian’s  poor  there  are  a  number  of  households  with  members  who are  em­
ployed. This is a peculiar feature of the Russian poverty. Decomposition by income sources con­
firms the later finding, by showing that the impact of wage on the poverty is the strongest. Mar­
ginal contribution of wage to the poverty alleviation, given that the other income sources are held 
constant, is over 50% and tends to increase over time with the exception of 1998. 
A simple interpretation of the results of the table 3 (appendix 2) and table 1 (appendix 3) 
for a case of two income sources and our poverty definition is that by eliminating the wage from 
the income would make half of the population poor. 
The processes during the period of mass wage arrears and economic crisis of 1998 confirm 
our findings. During these periods a number of working individuals became poor, thus the import­
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ance  of  the  wage  component  had  increased.  Overall,  eliminating  the  wage  from  the  income 
sources would make smaller share of households poor. Marginal contribution of wage if α=1 and 
α=2 is lower than for α=0.
The contribution of pensions is not that high, up to 26%, and tends to decrease. During the 
economic crisis of 1998 the role of this income component somewhat increased to 29.8%. Mar­
ginal contribution of pensions if α=1 and α=2 is higher, than if α=0.
Thus, the poverty which is driven by the pensions is more severe than that of the wage.
The aggregated share of the rest of the income sources is small, 16.7% in 1994 and 11.8% in 
2005. The most important category among this group is “other income” which tends to decrease 
from 5.8% in 1994 to 3.3% in 2005. The contribution of the child benefits did not exceed 1.1% and 
its role declined over time reaching 0.4% in 2005. We could not identify a trend in the contribution 
of the income from the subsistence agriculture. 
Concerning the poverty deepness, our results are not surprising, wage is found to cause least 
deficit, other income components and especially transfers have a higher impact.
Similar results are found for poverty severity. However it should be mentioned that the con­
tribution of child benefits to the poverty deepness and severity is the highest in 1994 – 1996. The 
deepness and severity of poverty had sharply increased in 2004 – 2005 with  respect to other types 
of benefits.
3.5. Yitzhaki inequality decomposition according to the sources of income between 
poor and non-poor groups
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient for the household disposable income is presented 
in Table 2 (appendix 3). The poverty line, as before, is defined as 50% of the household median per 
capita income. The first row of Table 2 presents a share of poor and non-poor individuals. Next row 
presents average per capita disposable income in each group. The average disposable income for the 
non-poor group was 5 - 6 times higher than that of the poor group. The largest gap was reached in 
1998 and then it declined until the year 2002. After 2002 we observe small increase in the gap 
between poor and non-poor groups which was followed by a decline in the gap. The smallest differ­
ence in the disposable income of poor and non-poor groups was observed in 2005.
The third row of the Table 2 (appendix 3) presents the values of the Gini coefficients. The 
Gini coefficient values are high and have several peaks. The initial value of the Gini coefficient was 
0.47 in 1994 and increased to 0.51 in 1998. Between 1998 and 2001 the values are decreasing 
reaching 0.46.  Finally  the Gini  index goes  up to  0.47 in  2003 and decreases to  0.42 in  2005. 
However if we separate the Gini coefficient for poor and non-poor groups it becomes clear that the 
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observed pattern of the Gini coefficients over time is only true for non-poor households. The vari­
ation for poor is much smaller. Moreover, inequality among poor had decreased from 0.23 to 0.21 
while for non-poor it went down from 0.47 to 0.42. During the economic crisis of 1998 the inequal­
ity among the non-poor households had increased while among poor households it had decreased. 
Intra group inequality decreased from 0.17 to 0.12. 
As we noted before  (see. page 13) the impact of a policy measure on inequality is a function 
of its effect on each component, weighted by the component’s share in income inequality. We de­
fine the share of each component  in the Gini  coefficient  as  pw  for  poor,  rw  for  non poor, bw  
between groups and show that 1bp rw w w+ + = . It is important to note that the contribution to the 
inequality of the poor group did not exceed 0.4% which means that their impact on the overall in­
equality is negligible. The later does not however imply that the poverty did not influence inequal­
ity. The influence of poverty materialised mainly through between groups inequality which varied 
from 26% to 34% over time. 
The general trend of contribution to the inequality shows that the contribution of non-poor 
households declined from 1995 to 2001 and again increased until 2004. The contribution of poor 
households to inequality reached its peake in 1996 and 2001 and sharply declined during other peri­
ods. The trend in the contribution of intra group inequality to the overall inequality is similar to that 
of poor households and opposite to that of non-poor households. 
Based on our knowledge of the contribution of every component of income to inequality we 
can analyse the effectiveness of the government policy based on every component of inequality. 
The parameter that captures that effect is elasticity of the Gini coefficient by income. To understand 
this concept an example may be helpful. Suppose the government increases the price of some con­
sumer good by some percentage points. How does the price increase influence the Gini coefficient 
(and the overall level of the wellbeing)? If the income Gini elasticity is equal (greater or less than) 
one, than the price increase will not influence (increase, decrease) inequality. This example is typic­
ally used to explain the income elasticity with the respect of consumer goods, but it is also suitable 
for explaining the Gini income elasticity. The decomposition of income elasticity in poor and non-
poor group as well as between these groups would allow us to see the effect of the price increase 
and subsidies on inequality between poor, non-poor and between these groups.  
Table 3 (appendix 3) presents decomposition of the Gini income elasticity by the sources of 
income from 1994 to 2005. 
The first column shows Gini elasticity by wage. In both groups the Gini elasticity by wage is 
close to one. However among poor group it is slightly below one and in the non poor group it is 
slightly above one. This implies that a small increase in wage would marginally decrease inequality 
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among poor  and marginally  increase among non-poor  households.  Intra-group elasticity  is  also 
close to one. 
In the previous analysis we found pensions to be a factor that decreased inequality among 
households. However inequality decomposition by the sources of income shows that over the whole 
period under investigation the pension growth lead to the increase in inequality among poor house­
holds and the decrease inequality among non-poor households. The latter results can be explained 
by the fact that pensioners income lies often around the poverty line. In the poor group pensioners 
are among better off households and in the non-poor group they are closer to the poor group. 
Increase in the child benefits decreases inequality in both groups. Intra-group inequality in­
dicates that the increase in the child benefits decreases the gap between rich and poor. Moreover 
this process had fastened after 2000. Our results indicate that child benefits are distributed among 
households whose income is around poverty line.  
An increase in the unemployment benefits and heating subsidies decreased inequality among 
poor and non-poor groups of households. These types of benefits led to the increased inequality in 
1995, 1996 and 2005 (this result is questionable, since some of the coefficients are not statistically 
significant). The analysis of the intra-group inequality confirms that the increase in this group of the 
benefits lead to the decrease in inequality between poor and non-poor groups. 
A final income component which includes inter-family transfers, charity, and benefits (ex­
cept of child benefits) increased inequality among both poor and non-poor households. However, its 
impact varied across groups. For poor households during the period 1994 – 1995 this income com­
ponent influenced inequality positively in 1996 the impact was reversed and then up to 2001 it 
raised inequality again and continued during 2004 – 2005. Among non-poor households the later in­
come component either decreased poverty or was neutral. Intra-group inequality was close to one 
during the whole period under investigation. 
4. Sensitivity analysis
It would be interesting to undertake sensitivity analysis to see whether observed over-time 
patterns are robust to changes in the poverty line. Thus, we recalculated H, Pgap and FGT(α=2) 
measures for alternative poverty lines set at 10 percent below and above the original line. The esti­
mates presented in Table 4 and Figures 11, 12 and 13 show the same cross-sector and over-time pat­
terns as with the original lines. This confirms that the analysis and findings presented so far are not 
sensitive to the exact position of the poverty line.
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Table 4. The estimates of poverty based on alternative poverty lines
FGT Year1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
When poverty line increased by 10%
α=0 0,209 0,198 0,237 0,232 0,217 0,224 0,210 0,209 0,192 0,185
α=1 0,080 0,078 0,092 0,084 0,081 0,086 0,076 0,079 0,065 0,064
α=2 0,044 0,043 0,050 0,044 0,044 0,047 0,041 0,042 0,034 0,033
When poverty line decreased by 10%
α=0 0,150 0,150 0,178 0,161 0,155 0,162 0,146 0,149 0,129 0,133
α=1 0,058 0,057 0,066 0,058 0,058 0,062 0,054 0,056 0,044 0,044
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Figure 13. Dynamics of FGT index values, α=2
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5. Conclusion: Determinants of poverty and policy proposals
We started the analysis with the year 1994. That time the reforms initiated during the 1990s 
brought levels of poverty and inequality to a socially intolerable level. However, the situation re­
mained relatively stable which indicates that Russian households adapted to the complex environ­
ment of economic reforms and learned to survive.
The review of the macroeconomic trends from 1994 to 2005 in the context of the social 
policy showed that the social policy was inadequate. The poverty level followed macroeconomic 
trends and only small fluctuations of the values of the index (especially transfer-sensitive indexes 
such as FGT for α=2) captured the impact of wage and pension indexation on the level of poverty 
for specific groups of households. We managed to clarify and add the following points to the ana­
lysis of the Russian poverty:
 As it was shown in the decomposition of the FGT index on the components of growth and 
redistribution, the redistribution component did not play any significant role on the poverty 
dynamics. Government steps to level out poverty were restricted to indexation of wages and 
pensions. In the process of the concentration of the capital among small share of population 
the government showed its inability in development and implementation of the mechanism 
of the income redistribution between rich and poor. 
 Decomposition of the FGT index by the income components showed that the presence of 
wage and/or pension as a source of the household income often ensured that the household 
would escape poverty. Over time we observe an increase in the importance of wage and de­
clining importance of transfer payments such as pensions and benefits. Taking into account 
the fact that during some years the average wage did not exceed the subsistence minimum 
and was paid with delays, a presence of employed members in the household did not guar­
antee that the income of the household would not drop below the poverty line. The income 
of households which relied on the social assistance was always below the poverty line.  
 The analysis of the inequality between two non-intersecting groups: poor and non-poor did 
showed that during the period under investigation the contribution of the poor group to the 
overall inequality was negligibly small (0.4%), at the same time the contribution to the intra-
group inequality reached 34%. This finding has a big potential implication for the develop­
ment of the redistribution policy. 
 The trends in the wage elasticity of the Gini coefficient revealed that changes in the wages 
did not alert inequality pattern in poor and non-poor groups as well as inequality between 
these two groups. 
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 The growth of  pensions during the period under investigation decreased inequality among 
non-poor households and increased it among poor households. Moreover, the growth  pen­
sions decreased the gap between poor and non-poor households. This confirms that the pen­
sioners are the poverty borderline group and that the pension indexation was the only effect­
ive instrument of poverty alleviation.  The responsiveness of the pensioners group to the 
pension indexation points out that a marginal increase in the level and the depth of poverty 
in 2001 is mostly related to a change in the poverty contribution dynamics: the share of the 
marginal contribution of wage into the poverty continued to rise, while the share of the pen­
sions started to decline.
 All types of the government assistance exhibit low contribution to inequality. More impor­
tant, similar Gini coefficient of elasticity for poor and non poor households point out to low 
efficiency of such assistance in the poverty alleviation. 
  The analysis of the poverty profile among residential areas confirmed that the highest level 
of poverty is among rural households. Rural poverty is also deeper and more severe than in 
the cities. Interrelation of the demographic and migration processes among different types of 
residential areas resulted in the fact that the lowest gap in the contribution to poverty was 
registered in 1998, after this period we observe a diverging trend in the poverty contribution 
and increasing poverty gap. 
 In the situation when government was incapable to developed effective mechanisms of the 
household social protection, households developed their own mechanisms of poverty allevi­
ation. Among such mechanisms are decrease in fertility rate which resulted in the increased 
number of households with one or no children and decrease number of households with two 
and more children. Another observed tendency is the increase in the number of employed 
members in the household. 
 It should be noted that the presence of three and more children in the household results in 
the higher level of poverty. However, the share of such households remained relatively sta­
ble and did not exhibit large decline comparing to the share of households with two chil­
dren. The likely explanation to this finding is that the decision to have more than three chil­
dren is dictated by non-economic factors. 
 The analysis of poverty profiles according to the characteristics of the head of households, 
indicate that, the households there the head is a male are less prone to poverty, however they 
are more responsive to economic shocks (economic crisis of 1998) due to the gender differ­
ences in the sector of employment. Increased demand for qualified workers allowed sharp 
decrease of poverty levels of the male headed households. Wage arrears of 1996 and finan­
cial crisis of 1998 impacted less the households there the head has a high education. The age 
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profile indicate that from 1996 to 1998 the poverty has increased among able-bodied heads 
of households and somewhat decreased among pensioner heads of households. After the 
year 2000 the poverty rate among able-bodied head of households started to decrease, while 
the poverty rate of pensioner headed households had increased. Similar relation was detect­
ed using decomposition by the sources of income.
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General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Regional centre 0,108 0,427 0,046 0,258 0,036 0,015 0,225 0,018 0,008 0,208
City 0,161 0,279 0,045 0,252 0,059 0,017 0,240 0,032 0,009 0,238
Urban type settlement 0,224 0,055 0,012 0,069 0,087 0,005 0,070 0,049 0,003 0,073
Village 0,317 0,238 0,075 0,421 0,134 0,032 0,464 0,075 0,018 0,482
1995 12017
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Regional centre 0,098 0,421 0,041 0,235 0,031 0,013 0,193 0,015 0,007 0,176
City 0,155 0,288 0,044 0,254 0,050 0,014 0,216 0,025 0,007 0,193
Urban type settlement 0,282 0,056 0,016 0,090 0,112 0,006 0,093 0,057 0,003 0,086
Village 0,312 0,236 0,074 0,421 0,142 0,033 0,499 0,085 0,020 0,545
1996 15817
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Regional centre 0,146 0,424 0,062 0,303 0,053 0,022 0,284 0,027 0,011 0,267
City 0,176 0,295 0,052 0,253 0,055 0,016 0,206 0,025 0,007 0,174
Urban type settlement 0,248 0,061 0,015 0,074 0,096 0,006 0,075 0,053 0,003 0,075
Village 0,345 0,220 0,076 0,370 0,156 0,034 0,436 0,094 0,021 0,484
1998 206
General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Regional centre 0,134 0,403 0,054 0,268 0,043 0,017 0,245 0,021 0,009 0,232
City 0,183 0,287 0,052 0,260 0,052 0,015 0,211 0,025 0,007 0,190
Urban type settlement 0,262 0,061 0,016 0,079 0,099 0,006 0,085 0,052 0,003 0,085
Village 0,318 0,249 0,079 0,393 0,130 0,032 0,460 0,073 0,018 0,493
2000 455
General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Regional centre 0,121 0,392 0,048 0,259 0,037 0,014 0,209 0,017 0,007 0,184
City 0,155 0,273 0,042 0,230 0,060 0,016 0,238 0,032 0,009 0,237
Urban type settlement 0,161 0,067 0,011 0,059 0,061 0,004 0,059 0,035 0,002 0,063
Village 0,311 0,268 0,083 0,453 0,127 0,034 0,493 0,072 0,019 0,516
 Ending of table 1




























General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Regional centre 0,136 0,418 0,057 0,293 0,049 0,020 0,278 0,025 0,010 0,261
City 0,123 0,260 0,032 0,165 0,041 0,011 0,145 0,020 0,005 0,130
Urban type settlement 0,191 0,068 0,013 0,067 0,061 0,004 0,057 0,031 0,002 0,053
Village 0,362 0,254 0,092 0,475 0,149 0,038 0,520 0,087 0,022 0,557
2002 875
General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Regional centre 0,094 0,424 0,040 0,225 0,034 0,014 0,222 0,019 0,008 0,230
City 0,145 0,255 0,037 0,209 0,050 0,013 0,197 0,026 0,007 0,189
Urban type settlement 0,269 0,060 0,016 0,091 0,079 0,005 0,073 0,037 0,002 0,063
Village 0,322 0,261 0,084 0,475 0,126 0,033 0,507 0,070 0,018 0,518
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Regional centre 0,089 0,405 0,036 0,199 0,026 0,011 0,159 0,012 0,005 0,134
City 0,161 0,269 0,043 0,240 0,055 0,015 0,218 0,028 0,008 0,211
Urban type settlement 0,223 0,067 0,015 0,083 0,086 0,006 0,086 0,044 0,003 0,082
Village 0,335 0,258 0,086 0,478 0,140 0,036 0,537 0,080 0,021 0,573
2004 1315
General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Regional centre 0,090 0,407 0,037 0,234 0,032 0,013 0,237 0,017 0,007 0,246
City 0,114 0,277 0,031 0,200 0,032 0,009 0,166 0,015 0,004 0,145
Urban type settlement 0,180 0,064 0,012 0,074 0,077 0,005 0,092 0,049 0,003 0,113
Village 0,306 0,252 0,077 0,492 0,108 0,027 0,505 0,055 0,014 0,496
2005 1733
General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Regional centre 0,078 0,395 0,031 0,198 0,029 0,011 0,212 0,016 0,007 0,238
City 0,137 0,277 0,038 0,246 0,039 0,011 0,201 0,018 0,005 0,180
Urban type settlement 0,179 0,062 0,011 0,072 0,075 0,005 0,086 0,046 0,003 0,104
Village 0,281 0,265 0,075 0,484 0,102 0,027 0,500 0,049 0,013 0,478




























General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Single adult 0,058 0,055 0,003 0,018 0,015 0,001 0,012 0,007 0,000 0,011
Two adults without 
children 0,096 0,172 0,017 0,092 0,031 0,005 0,078 0,016 0,003 0,073
Two with children 0,196 0,371 0,073 0,406 0,077 0,029 0,416 0,042 0,016 0,421
One adult with chil­
dren 0,221 0,044 0,010 0,054 0,064 0,003 0,041 0,030 0,001 0,035
Multigenerational 
families 0,214 0,358 0,077 0,429 0,087 0,031 0,453 0,048 0,017 0,460
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Single adult 0,060 0,059 0,004 0,020 0,012 0,001 0,010 0,006 0,000 0,009
Two adults without 
children 0,092 0,169 0,016 0,089 0,031 0,005 0,079 0,018 0,003 0,082
Two with children 0,187 0,355 0,066 0,379 0,076 0,027 0,400 0,043 0,015 0,417
One adult with chil­
dren 0,217 0,041 0,009 0,051 0,076 0,003 0,046 0,040 0,002 0,045
Multigenerational 
families 0,214 0,377 0,081 0,461 0,083 0,031 0,464 0,044 0,017 0,447
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Single adult 0,031 0,052 0,002 0,008 0,011 0,001 0,007 0,005 0,000 0,007
Two adults without 
children 0,101 0,156 0,016 0,077 0,035 0,005 0,070 0,020 0,003 0,073
Two with children 0,231 0,363 0,084 0,410 0,092 0,033 0,424 0,049 0,018 0,418
One adult with chil­
dren 0,255 0,042 0,011 0,053 0,086 0,004 0,046 0,045 0,002 0,044
Multigenerational 
families 0,239 0,387 0,093 0,453 0,092 0,036 0,453 0,051 0,020 0,459




























General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Single adult 0,021 0,059 0,001 0,006 0,010 0,001 0,008 0,006 0,000 0,010
Two adults without 
children 0,079 0,172 0,014 0,068 0,019 0,003 0,047 0,008 0,001 0,039
Two with children 0,268 0,337 0,090 0,448 0,102 0,034 0,487 0,056 0,019 0,511
One adult with chil­
dren 0,245 0,047 0,012 0,057 0,080 0,004 0,053 0,042 0,002 0,053
Multigenerational 
families 0,220 0,385 0,085 0,421 0,074 0,028 0,405 0,037 0,014 0,387
2000 455
General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Single adult 0,052 0,063 0,003 0,018 0,009 0,001 0,009 0,005 0,000 0,008
Two adults without 
children 0,091 0,167 0,015 0,083 0,027 0,004 0,065 0,013 0,002 0,058
Two with children 0,216 0,312 0,067 0,367 0,082 0,026 0,371 0,044 0,014 0,368
One adult with chil­
dren 0,237 0,048 0,012 0,063 0,094 0,005 0,066 0,051 0,002 0,066
Multigenerational 
families 0,211 0,410 0,086 0,470 0,082 0,034 0,490 0,045 0,019 0,500
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Single adult 0,061 0,065 0,004 0,020 0,012 0,001 0,011 0,008 0,001 0,013
Two adults without 
children 0,100 0,159 0,016 0,082 0,030 0,005 0,064 0,015 0,002 0,061
Two with children 0,218 0,289 0,063 0,326 0,092 0,027 0,363 0,054 0,016 0,395
One adult with chil­
dren 0,260 0,051 0,014 0,069 0,110 0,006 0,077 0,061 0,003 0,079
Multigenerational 
families 0,224 0,435 0,098 0,503 0,081 0,035 0,484 0,041 0,018 0,453




























General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Single adult 0,065 0,066 0,004 0,024 0,012 0,001 0,012 0,005 0,000 0,009
Two adults without 
children 0,090 0,159 0,014 0,081 0,024 0,004 0,060 0,010 0,002 0,046
Two with children 0,233 0,274 0,064 0,361 0,091 0,025 0,383 0,052 0,014 0,401
One adult with chil­
dren 0,247 0,052 0,013 0,072 0,074 0,004 0,060 0,038 0,002 0,055
Multigenerational 
families 0,182 0,449 0,082 0,461 0,070 0,031 0,486 0,039 0,017 0,489
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Single adult 0,077 0,069 0,005 0,029 0,019 0,001 0,019 0,009 0,001 0,017
Two adults without 
children 0,099 0,162 0,016 0,089 0,031 0,005 0,076 0,016 0,003 0,071
Two with children 0,194 0,274 0,053 0,293 0,077 0,021 0,315 0,044 0,012 0,333
One adult with chil­
dren 0,275 0,054 0,015 0,082 0,105 0,006 0,084 0,052 0,003 0,079
Multigenerational 
families 0,208 0,441 0,092 0,507 0,077 0,034 0,506 0,041 0,018 0,501
2004 1315
General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Single adult 0,085 0,070 0,006 0,038 0,022 0,002 0,028 0,009 0,001 0,023
Two adults without 
children 0,085 0,164 0,014 0,088 0,027 0,004 0,081 0,013 0,002 0,078
Two with children 0,191 0,277 0,053 0,337 0,072 0,020 0,369 0,040 0,011 0,392
One adult with chil­
dren 0,324 0,055 0,018 0,114 0,127 0,007 0,130 0,073 0,004 0,143
Multigenerational 
families 0,153 0,433 0,066 0,422 0,049 0,021 0,392 0,024 0,010 0,364




























General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Single adult 0,076 0,070 0,005 0,034 0,017 0,001 0,023 0,007 0,000 0,018
Two adults without 
children 0,093 0,161 0,015 0,097 0,025 0,004 0,076 0,010 0,002 0,060
Two with children 0,184 0,272 0,050 0,324 0,067 0,018 0,339 0,037 0,010 0,367
One adult with chil­
dren 0,273 0,045 0,012 0,079 0,090 0,004 0,075 0,040 0,002 0,066
Multigenerational 
families 0,159 0,452 0,072 0,465 0,058 0,026 0,488 0,029 0,013 0,488
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General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
No children 0,108 0,360 0,039 0,217 0,037 0,013 0,193 0,018 0,007 0,178
One child 0,163 0,313 0,051 0,286 0,060 0,019 0,274 0,031 0,010 0,263
Two children 0,246 0,256 0,063 0,352 0,098 0,025 0,366 0,055 0,014 0,378
Three and more 
children 0,362 0,072 0,026 0,145 0,160 0,011 0,167 0,094 0,007 0,181
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
No children 0,115 0,371 0,043 0,245 0,037 0,014 0,204 0,019 0,007 0,187
One child 0,164 0,299 0,049 0,281 0,063 0,019 0,281 0,034 0,010 0,279
Two children 0,213 0,263 0,056 0,321 0,085 0,022 0,333 0,046 0,012 0,329
Three and more 
children 0,405 0,066 0,027 0,154 0,184 0,012 0,182 0,115 0,008 0,205
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
No children 0,122 0,348 0,042 0,207 0,045 0,016 0,198 0,025 0,009 0,199
One child 0,196 0,320 0,063 0,306 0,072 0,023 0,293 0,038 0,012 0,286
Two children 0,267 0,270 0,072 0,351 0,095 0,026 0,326 0,047 0,013 0,293
Three and more 
children 0,444 0,063 0,028 0,137 0,227 0,014 0,182 0,151 0,010 0,222
1998 206
General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
No children 0,105 0,375 0,039 0,195 0,029 0,011 0,152 0,013 0,005 0,130
One child 0,203 0,324 0,066 0,326 0,068 0,022 0,314 0,034 0,011 0,298
Two children 0,313 0,248 0,078 0,386 0,110 0,027 0,387 0,058 0,014 0,389
Three and more 
children 0,360 0,052 0,019 0,093 0,198 0,010 0,147 0,131 0,007 0,184




























General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
No children 0,104 0,379 0,040 0,215 0,034 0,013 0,189 0,018 0,007 0,183
One child 0,207 0,335 0,069 0,377 0,076 0,025 0,367 0,039 0,013 0,352
Two children 0,234 0,228 0,053 0,290 0,093 0,021 0,305 0,053 0,012 0,322
Three and more 
children 0,371 0,059 0,022 0,118 0,162 0,010 0,138 0,091 0,005 0,143
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
No children 0,124 0,393 0,049 0,251 0,039 0,015 0,208 0,019 0,008 0,190
One child 0,174 0,337 0,059 0,303 0,061 0,020 0,280 0,032 0,011 0,268
Two children 0,274 0,209 0,057 0,294 0,108 0,023 0,309 0,060 0,013 0,315
Three and more 
children 0,480 0,061 0,029 0,152 0,240 0,015 0,202 0,148 0,009 0,228
2002 875
General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
No children 0,107 0,403 0,043 0,243 0,029 0,012 0,181 0,013 0,005 0,150
One child 0,171 0,341 0,058 0,330 0,061 0,021 0,321 0,031 0,011 0,301
Two children 0,244 0,196 0,048 0,271 0,091 0,018 0,277 0,051 0,010 0,286
Three and more 
children 0,464 0,060 0,028 0,156 0,240 0,014 0,221 0,156 0,009 0,263
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
No children 0,113 0,404 0,046 0,252 0,038 0,015 0,228 0,020 0,008 0,221
One child 0,168 0,341 0,057 0,316 0,055 0,019 0,279 0,026 0,009 0,250
Two children 0,272 0,197 0,054 0,296 0,113 0,022 0,330 0,064 0,013 0,353
Three and more 
children 0,424 0,058 0,025 0,136 0,190 0,011 0,164 0,109 0,006 0,175




























General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
No children 0,100 0,422 0,042 0,269 0,030 0,013 0,234 0,014 0,006 0,204
One child 0,129 0,342 0,044 0,281 0,044 0,015 0,277 0,022 0,008 0,267
Two children 0,253 0,187 0,047 0,302 0,090 0,017 0,312 0,048 0,009 0,322
Three and more 
children 0,478 0,049 0,023 0,148 0,197 0,010 0,177 0,119 0,006 0,207
2005 1733
General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
No children 0,116 0,427 0,049 0,320 0,036 0,015 0,281 0,016 0,007 0,252
One child 0,138 0,348 0,048 0,310 0,045 0,016 0,292 0,022 0,008 0,278
Two children 0,243 0,175 0,042 0,275 0,089 0,016 0,288 0,047 0,008 0,298
Three and more 
children 0,289 0,051 0,015 0,095 0,148 0,008 0,139 0,093 0,005 0,173
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General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Nobody works 0,175 0,183 0,032 0,179 0,055 0,010 0,148 0,026 0,005 0,130
One working 0,216 0,314 0,068 0,379 0,084 0,027 0,386 0,045 0,014 0,382
Two working 0,166 0,399 0,066 0,370 0,069 0,027 0,400 0,039 0,016 0,422
Three and more 
working 0,125 0,104 0,013 0,072 0,044 0,005 0,066 0,024 0,002 0,066
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Nobody works 0,178 0,188 0,033 0,191 0,052 0,010 0,146 0,025 0,005 0,128
One working 0,209 0,318 0,067 0,381 0,087 0,028 0,413 0,050 0,016 0,429
Two working 0,154 0,381 0,059 0,335 0,060 0,023 0,339 0,033 0,012 0,337
Three and more 
working 0,145 0,112 0,016 0,093 0,062 0,007 0,103 0,035 0,004 0,106
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Nobody works 0,155 0,160 0,025 0,122 0,060 0,010 0,122 0,033 0,005 0,122
One working 0,237 0,331 0,078 0,383 0,092 0,030 0,385 0,048 0,016 0,374
Two working 0,207 0,396 0,082 0,401 0,076 0,030 0,385 0,042 0,017 0,391
Three and more 
working 0,171 0,113 0,019 0,094 0,075 0,009 0,108 0,043 0,005 0,113
1998 206
General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Nobody works 0,185 0,217 0,040 0,199 0,063 0,014 0,194 0,032 0,007 0,190
One working 0,217 0,333 0,072 0,358 0,076 0,025 0,360 0,042 0,014 0,373
Two working 0,209 0,354 0,074 0,368 0,076 0,027 0,383 0,040 0,014 0,380
Three and more 
working 0,157 0,096 0,015 0,075 0,046 0,004 0,062 0,022 0,002 0,057
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General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Nobody works 0,173 0,226 0,039 0,213 0,059 0,013 0,194 0,031 0,007 0,185
One working 0,231 0,326 0,075 0,409 0,088 0,029 0,416 0,047 0,015 0,410
Two working 0,170 0,346 0,059 0,320 0,064 0,022 0,320 0,036 0,012 0,331
Three and more 
working 0,105 0,102 0,011 0,059 0,048 0,005 0,071 0,027 0,003 0,074
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Nobody works 0,230 0,233 0,053 0,276 0,088 0,021 0,281 0,050 0,012 0,290
One working 0,234 0,336 0,079 0,405 0,087 0,029 0,398 0,046 0,015 0,387
Two working 0,153 0,324 0,050 0,256 0,058 0,019 0,259 0,032 0,010 0,260
Three and more 
working 0,115 0,107 0,012 0,063 0,043 0,005 0,062 0,024 0,003 0,063
2002 875
General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Nobody works 0,230 0,220 0,051 0,285 0,090 0,020 0,305 0,051 0,011 0,320
One working 0,224 0,320 0,072 0,404 0,083 0,027 0,411 0,045 0,014 0,408
Two working 0,139 0,337 0,047 0,264 0,046 0,016 0,240 0,024 0,008 0,231
Three and more 
working 0,067 0,123 0,008 0,047 0,023 0,003 0,045 0,012 0,001 0,042
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Nobody works 0,238 0,223 0,053 0,294 0,092 0,020 0,304 0,049 0,011 0,307
One working 0,207 0,323 0,067 0,370 0,078 0,025 0,374 0,041 0,013 0,365
Two working 0,156 0,325 0,051 0,280 0,056 0,018 0,273 0,031 0,010 0,282
Three and more 
working 0,079 0,128 0,010 0,056 0,026 0,003 0,050 0,013 0,002 0,046




























General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Nobody works 0,223 0,214 0,048 0,305 0,081 0,017 0,321 0,043 0,009 0,325
One working 0,201 0,333 0,067 0,425 0,069 0,023 0,428 0,037 0,012 0,435
Two working 0,111 0,317 0,035 0,223 0,034 0,011 0,198 0,016 0,005 0,182
Three and more 
working 0,053 0,136 0,007 0,046 0,021 0,003 0,052 0,012 0,002 0,058
2005 1733
General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Nobody works 0,203 0,204 0,042 0,269 0,080 0,016 0,303 0,044 0,009 0,326
One working 0,224 0,301 0,067 0,436 0,078 0,023 0,433 0,039 0,012 0,428
Two working 0,112 0,352 0,040 0,256 0,033 0,012 0,216 0,015 0,005 0,198
Three and more 
working 0,042 0,143 0,006 0,039 0,018 0,003 0,048 0,009 0,001 0,049
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General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,122 0,559 0,068 0,383 0,046 0,026 0,375 0,024 0,013 0,364
Female 0,251 0,441 0,110 0,617 0,097 0,043 0,625 0,054 0,024 0,636
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,122 0,545 0,067 0,381 0,049 0,027 0,401 0,029 0,016 0,427
Female 0,238 0,455 0,108 0,619 0,088 0,040 0,599 0,047 0,021 0,573
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Male 0,170 0,538 0,092 0,447 0,065 0,035 0,443 0,035 0,019 0,436
Female 0,245 0,462 0,113 0,553 0,095 0,044 0,557 0,052 0,024 0,564
1998 206
General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,145 0,519 0,075 0,374 0,049 0,025 0,361 0,026 0,013 0,358
Female 0,262 0,481 0,126 0,626 0,093 0,045 0,639 0,049 0,024 0,642
2000 455
General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,121 0,534 0,065 0,353 0,049 0,026 0,376 0,028 0,015 0,404
Female 0,256 0,466 0,119 0,647 0,092 0,043 0,624 0,048 0,022 0,596
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Male 0,134 0,541 0,072 0,372 0,049 0,027 0,363 0,027 0,015 0,368
Female 0,265 0,459 0,122 0,628 0,101 0,046 0,637 0,055 0,025 0,632
2002 875
General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Male 0,127 0,552 0,070 0,393 0,046 0,026 0,395 0,025 0,014 0,396
Female 0,240 0,448 0,107 0,607 0,087 0,039 0,605 0,048 0,021 0,604
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Male 0,120 0,528 0,064 0,351 0,042 0,022 0,333 0,022 0,012 0,327
Female 0,248 0,472 0,117 0,649 0,095 0,045 0,667 0,051 0,024 0,673
2004 1315
General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Male 0,111 0,556 0,062 0,395 0,037 0,021 0,382 0,019 0,010 0,371























General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,122 0,559 0,068 0,383 0,046 0,026 0,375 0,024 0,013 0,364
Female 0,251 0,441 0,110 0,617 0,097 0,043 0,625 0,054 0,024 0,636
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Male 0,122 0,545 0,067 0,381 0,049 0,027 0,401 0,029 0,016 0,427
Female 0,238 0,455 0,108 0,619 0,088 0,040 0,599 0,047 0,021 0,573
2005 1733
General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Male 0,107 0,548 0,059 0,381 0,036 0,020 0,368 0,018 0,010 0,368
Female 0,212 0,452 0,095 0,619 0,076 0,034 0,632 0,038 0,017 0,632
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Table 6. Decomposition of FGT index according to age of household head 



















General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,204 0,076 0,015 0,086 0,087 0,007 0,095 0,052 0,004 0,105
25-34 0,185 0,211 0,039 0,219 0,070 0,015 0,216 0,038 0,008 0,217
35-44 0,175 0,261 0,046 0,255 0,068 0,018 0,260 0,038 0,010 0,266
45-54 0,116 0,141 0,016 0,091 0,041 0,006 0,084 0,021 0,003 0,078
55-59 0,166 0,092 0,015 0,086 0,063 0,006 0,084 0,031 0,003 0,078
60-65 0,224 0,087 0,019 0,109 0,093 0,008 0,117 0,052 0,005 0,122
After 65 y.o. 0,209 0,132 0,028 0,154 0,075 0,010 0,144 0,038 0,005 0,134
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,193 0,074 0,014 0,082 0,093 0,007 0,102 0,057 0,004 0,115
25-34 0,169 0,204 0,034 0,197 0,067 0,014 0,204 0,038 0,008 0,208
35-44 0,169 0,262 0,044 0,254 0,066 0,017 0,259 0,037 0,010 0,261
45-54 0,168 0,161 0,027 0,154 0,061 0,010 0,148 0,034 0,005 0,147
55-59 0,174 0,086 0,015 0,086 0,064 0,005 0,082 0,033 0,003 0,076
60-65 0,193 0,076 0,015 0,084 0,075 0,006 0,086 0,044 0,003 0,091
After 65 y.o. 0,184 0,137 0,025 0,144 0,059 0,008 0,120 0,027 0,004 0,101
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,215 0,069 0,015 0,073 0,113 0,008 0,100 0,071 0,005 0,116
25-34 0,219 0,218 0,048 0,234 0,087 0,019 0,241 0,049 0,011 0,249
35-44 0,213 0,292 0,062 0,304 0,082 0,024 0,304 0,045 0,013 0,309
45-54 0,157 0,143 0,022 0,109 0,062 0,009 0,112 0,032 0,005 0,108
55-59 0,220 0,092 0,020 0,099 0,084 0,008 0,099 0,045 0,004 0,097
60-65 0,185 0,065 0,012 0,059 0,048 0,003 0,040 0,020 0,001 0,030
After 65 y.o. 0,208 0,120 0,025 0,122 0,069 0,008 0,105 0,032 0,004 0,090
Continuation of table 6
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General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,255 0,065 0,017 0,082 0,099 0,006 0,092 0,059 0,004 0,104
25-34 0,196 0,178 0,035 0,173 0,070 0,012 0,177 0,041 0,007 0,196
35-44 0,221 0,271 0,060 0,297 0,080 0,022 0,308 0,042 0,011 0,310
45-54 0,221 0,167 0,037 0,183 0,088 0,015 0,210 0,048 0,008 0,217
55-59 0,187 0,062 0,012 0,057 0,067 0,004 0,059 0,035 0,002 0,058
60-65 0,155 0,087 0,013 0,067 0,042 0,004 0,052 0,017 0,001 0,039
After 65 y.o. 0,166 0,170 0,028 0,140 0,042 0,007 0,103 0,017 0,003 0,077
2000 455
General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,259 0,065 0,017 0,091 0,125 0,008 0,117 0,078 0,005 0,135
25-34 0,192 0,170 0,033 0,178 0,084 0,014 0,207 0,049 0,008 0,225
35-44 0,170 0,271 0,046 0,252 0,060 0,016 0,236 0,031 0,009 0,229
45-54 0,153 0,196 0,030 0,163 0,065 0,013 0,186 0,038 0,007 0,199
55-59 0,143 0,040 0,006 0,031 0,042 0,002 0,025 0,017 0,001 0,018
60-65 0,209 0,099 0,021 0,113 0,057 0,006 0,082 0,023 0,002 0,062
After 65 y.o. 0,199 0,159 0,032 0,172 0,064 0,010 0,147 0,031 0,005 0,132
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,178 0,075 0,013 0,069 0,079 0,006 0,081 0,051 0,004 0,096
25-34 0,175 0,172 0,030 0,155 0,071 0,012 0,166 0,039 0,007 0,168
35-44 0,169 0,254 0,043 0,222 0,072 0,018 0,249 0,043 0,011 0,272
45-54 0,198 0,202 0,040 0,207 0,081 0,016 0,223 0,045 0,009 0,231
55-59 0,221 0,045 0,010 0,051 0,088 0,004 0,054 0,046 0,002 0,052
60-65 0,250 0,091 0,023 0,118 0,070 0,006 0,087 0,030 0,003 0,069
After 65 y.o. 0,216 0,161 0,035 0,179 0,064 0,010 0,140 0,028 0,004 0,112
Continuation of table 6
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General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,242 0,073 0,018 0,100 0,113 0,008 0,128 0,067 0,005 0,138
25-34 0,161 0,175 0,028 0,159 0,062 0,011 0,166 0,036 0,006 0,179
35-44 0,176 0,259 0,046 0,258 0,063 0,016 0,253 0,037 0,009 0,269
45-54 0,143 0,208 0,030 0,168 0,049 0,010 0,158 0,026 0,005 0,151
55-59 0,158 0,050 0,008 0,045 0,058 0,003 0,045 0,027 0,001 0,038
60-65 0,200 0,081 0,016 0,091 0,070 0,006 0,087 0,036 0,003 0,082
After 65 y.o. 0,206 0,154 0,032 0,179 0,069 0,011 0,163 0,033 0,005 0,144
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,230 0,064 0,015 0,081 0,107 0,007 0,102 0,061 0,004 0,108
25-34 0,181 0,186 0,034 0,186 0,070 0,013 0,192 0,038 0,007 0,199
35-44 0,163 0,245 0,040 0,221 0,060 0,015 0,217 0,031 0,008 0,211
45-54 0,164 0,210 0,035 0,191 0,062 0,013 0,194 0,036 0,008 0,211
55-59 0,152 0,064 0,010 0,054 0,048 0,003 0,046 0,025 0,002 0,045
60-65 0,208 0,068 0,014 0,078 0,080 0,005 0,081 0,042 0,003 0,080
After 65 y.o. 0,208 0,164 0,034 0,188 0,069 0,011 0,168 0,032 0,005 0,146
2004 1315
General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,140 0,072 0,010 0,064 0,054 0,004 0,072 0,027 0,002 0,071
25-34 0,157 0,201 0,031 0,201 0,058 0,012 0,215 0,032 0,006 0,230
35-44 0,150 0,243 0,037 0,233 0,051 0,013 0,232 0,027 0,007 0,237
45-54 0,144 0,205 0,030 0,189 0,052 0,011 0,196 0,028 0,006 0,204
55-59 0,124 0,070 0,009 0,055 0,050 0,003 0,064 0,026 0,002 0,065
60-65 0,217 0,054 0,012 0,074 0,078 0,004 0,077 0,042 0,002 0,080
After 65 y.o. 0,186 0,155 0,029 0,184 0,050 0,008 0,143 0,021 0,003 0,114
Ending of table 6
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General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Before 25 y.o. 0,144 0,065 0,009 0,061 0,064 0,004 0,078 0,036 0,002 0,086
25-34 0,130 0,193 0,025 0,162 0,052 0,010 0,187 0,028 0,005 0,200
35-44 0,163 0,241 0,039 0,255 0,058 0,014 0,258 0,031 0,007 0,272
45-54 0,123 0,218 0,027 0,174 0,042 0,009 0,171 0,022 0,005 0,179
55-59 0,157 0,074 0,012 0,075 0,051 0,004 0,069 0,024 0,002 0,064
60-65 0,175 0,038 0,007 0,043 0,055 0,002 0,038 0,021 0,001 0,029
After 65 y.o. 0,207 0,171 0,036 0,230 0,063 0,011 0,200 0,027 0,005 0,170
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General 0,179 1,000 0,179 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,280 0,262 0,073 0,409 0,107 0,028 0,409 0,057 0,015 0,402
Secondary 0,189 0,191 0,036 0,202 0,074 0,014 0,206 0,039 0,008 0,202
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,199 0,135 0,027 0,150 0,076 0,010 0,149 0,042 0,006 0,153
Secondary vocational 0,149 0,203 0,030 0,169 0,060 0,012 0,177 0,033 0,007 0,181
Higher and postgraduate 0,060 0,209 0,013 0,070 0,019 0,004 0,059 0,011 0,002 0,061
1995 120
General 0,175 1,000 0,175 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,260 0,249 0,065 0,371 0,101 0,025 0,373 0,057 0,014 0,380
Secondary 0,197 0,237 0,047 0,267 0,080 0,019 0,281 0,045 0,011 0,288
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,173 0,129 0,022 0,128 0,075 0,010 0,144 0,044 0,006 0,152
Secondary vocational 0,145 0,195 0,028 0,162 0,052 0,010 0,150 0,027 0,005 0,141
Higher and postgraduate 0,068 0,190 0,013 0,073 0,019 0,004 0,053 0,008 0,001 0,039
1996 158
General 0,205 1,000 0,205 1,000 0,079 0,079 1,000 0,043 0,043 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,250 0,224 0,056 0,274 0,092 0,021 0,261 0,049 0,011 0,256
Secondary 0,246 0,231 0,057 0,278 0,111 0,026 0,326 0,066 0,015 0,356
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,241 0,134 0,032 0,158 0,086 0,012 0,147 0,044 0,006 0,137
Secondary vocational 0,189 0,214 0,040 0,197 0,069 0,015 0,188 0,036 0,008 0,177
Higher and postgraduate 0,099 0,197 0,019 0,095 0,031 0,006 0,078 0,016 0,003 0,074
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General 0,201 1,000 0,201 1,000 0,070 0,070 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,245 0,247 0,060 0,301 0,078 0,019 0,273 0,037 0,009 0,247
Secondary 0,272 0,223 0,061 0,302 0,107 0,024 0,340 0,061 0,014 0,367
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,242 0,128 0,031 0,153 0,095 0,012 0,173 0,053 0,007 0,182
Secondary vocational 0,168 0,208 0,035 0,173 0,054 0,011 0,160 0,029 0,006 0,164
Higher and postgraduate 0,073 0,194 0,014 0,071 0,019 0,004 0,054 0,008 0,001 0,040
2000 455
General 0,184 1,000 0,184 1,000 0,069 0,069 1,000 0,037 0,037 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,235 0,222 0,053 0,285 0,083 0,019 0,270 0,044 0,010 0,264
Secondary 0,215 0,223 0,048 0,261 0,096 0,021 0,312 0,057 0,013 0,344
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,195 0,148 0,029 0,158 0,074 0,011 0,160 0,039 0,006 0,157
Secondary vocational 0,179 0,214 0,038 0,209 0,056 0,012 0,175 0,027 0,006 0,155
Higher and postgraduate 0,082 0,193 0,016 0,087 0,030 0,006 0,084 0,015 0,003 0,079
2001 667
General 0,194 1,000 0,194 1,000 0,073 0,073 1,000 0,040 0,040 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,299 0,216 0,065 0,332 0,104 0,022 0,305 0,053 0,011 0,286
Secondary 0,210 0,227 0,048 0,246 0,092 0,021 0,284 0,055 0,013 0,314
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,189 0,156 0,030 0,152 0,077 0,012 0,163 0,044 0,007 0,170
Secondary vocational 0,148 0,199 0,030 0,152 0,054 0,011 0,145 0,027 0,005 0,136
Higher and postgraduate 0,115 0,201 0,023 0,119 0,037 0,008 0,103 0,019 0,004 0,093




























General 0,177 1,000 0,177 1,000 0,065 0,065 1,000 0,035 0,035 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,288 0,192 0,055 0,311 0,114 0,022 0,336 0,065 0,012 0,351
Secondary 0,199 0,238 0,047 0,268 0,080 0,019 0,295 0,044 0,010 0,295
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,171 0,143 0,025 0,138 0,056 0,008 0,123 0,029 0,004 0,117
Secondary vocational 0,140 0,209 0,029 0,166 0,045 0,009 0,146 0,022 0,005 0,130
Higher and postgraduate 0,095 0,218 0,021 0,117 0,030 0,007 0,101 0,017 0,004 0,107
2003 1090
General 0,181 1,000 0,181 1,000 0,067 0,067 1,000 0,036 0,036 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,304 0,192 0,058 0,324 0,111 0,021 0,315 0,057 0,011 0,306
Secondary 0,204 0,237 0,048 0,268 0,082 0,019 0,288 0,046 0,011 0,301
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,164 0,142 0,023 0,129 0,058 0,008 0,122 0,031 0,004 0,121
Secondary vocational 0,170 0,218 0,037 0,205 0,064 0,014 0,208 0,035 0,008 0,215
Higher and postgraduate 0,063 0,210 0,013 0,074 0,021 0,004 0,066 0,010 0,002 0,057
2004 1315
General 0,157 1,000 0,157 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,028 0,028 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,249 0,171 0,043 0,272 0,087 0,015 0,276 0,046 0,008 0,283
Secondary 0,183 0,244 0,044 0,284 0,061 0,015 0,279 0,032 0,008 0,275
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,120 0,150 0,018 0,115 0,048 0,007 0,135 0,028 0,004 0,149
Secondary vocational 0,149 0,211 0,032 0,201 0,046 0,010 0,180 0,021 0,004 0,159
Higher and postgraduate 0,089 0,224 0,020 0,128 0,031 0,007 0,130 0,017 0,004 0,133




























General 0,154 1,000 0,154 1,000 0,054 0,054 1,000 0,027 0,027 1,000
Primary and incomplete 
primary 0,236 0,180 0,043 0,277 0,077 0,014 0,257 0,036 0,007 0,238
Secondary 0,164 0,239 0,039 0,256 0,066 0,016 0,294 0,037 0,009 0,326
Primary vocational with 
secondary 0,119 0,153 0,018 0,118 0,045 0,007 0,127 0,023 0,003 0,128
Secondary vocational 0,172 0,202 0,035 0,226 0,053 0,011 0,199 0,025 0,005 0,181
Higher and postgraduate 0,084 0,226 0,019 0,123 0,029 0,007 0,122 0,015 0,003 0,127
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es Growth effect Redistribution effect Residual
α = 0
1994 1995 0,1789 0,0604 -0,1185 -0,1170 -0,0040 0,0025
1995 1996 0,1749 0,1339 -0,0410 -0,0685 0,0365 -0,0089
1996 1998 0,2048 0,1244 -0,0804 -0,0655 -0,0095 -0,0053
1998 2000 0,2015 0,0516 -0,1499 -0,1560 -0,0224 0,0286
2000 2001 0,1838 0,1051 -0,0787 -0,0839 0,0040 0,0012
2001 2002 0,1940 0,1091 -0,0849 -0,0620 -0,0293 0,0064
2002 2003 0,1771 0,1298 -0,0473 -0,0680 0,0181 0,0026
2003 2004 0,1808 0,1086 -0,0722 -0,0488 -0,0171 -0,0063
2004 2005 0,1569 0,0945 -0,0624 -0,0452 -0,0235 0,0062
α = 1
1994 1995 0,0687 0,0230 -0,0456 -0,0469 -0,0014 0,0027
1995 1996 0,0670 0,0492 -0,0178 -0,0252 0,0132 -0,0058
1996 1998 0,0786 0,0434 -0,0352 -0,0267 -0,0106 0,0021
1998 2000 0,0703 0,0177 -0,0526 -0,0524 -0,0035 0,0032
2000 2001 0,0690 0,0389 -0,0302 -0,0320 0,0028 -0,0010
2001 2002 0,0731 0,0411 -0,0320 -0,0235 -0,0123 0,0037
2002 2003 0,0648 0,0463 -0,0185 -0,0238 0,0087 -0,0034
2003 2004 0,0673 0,0377 -0,0296 -0,0195 -0,0117 0,0017
2004 2005 0,0540 0,0315 -0,0226 -0,0150 -0,0101 0,0025
  α = 2
1994 1995 0,0372 0,0124 -0,0248 -0,0260 -0,0001 0,0013
1995 1996 0,0370 0,0269 -0,0101 -0,0139 0,0068 -0,0029
1996 1998 0,0428 0,0232 -0,0197 -0,0145 -0,0070 0,0018
1998 2000 0,0371 0,0087 -0,0284 -0,0271 -0,0010 -0,0002
2000 2001 0,0372 0,0209 -0,0164 -0,0178 0,0019 -0,0005






es Growth effect Redistribution effect Residual
α = 0
2002 2003 0,0353 0,0243 -0,0110 -0,0128 0,0041 -0,0023
2003 2004 0,0359 0,0200 -0,0159 -0,0108 -0,0071 0,0020
2004 2005 0,0281 0,0158 -0,0122 -0,0074 -0,0060 0,0012





indexes Growth effect Redistribution effect 
α = 0
1994 1995 0,1789 0,0604 -0,1185 -0,1157 -0,0028
1995 1996 0,1749 0,1339 -0,0410 -0,0730 0,0320
1996 1998 0,2048 0,1244 -0,0804 -0,0682 -0,0122
1998 2000 0,2015 0,0516 -0,1499 -0,1417 -0,0081
2000 2001 0,1838 0,1051 -0,0787 -0,0833 0,0046
2001 2002 0,1940 0,1091 -0,0849 -0,0589 -0,0261
2002 2003 0,1771 0,1298 -0,0473 -0,0667 0,0194
2003 2004 0,1808 0,1086 -0,0722 -0,0520 -0,0202
2004 2005 0,1569 0,0945 -0,0624 -0,0421 -0,0204
α = 1
1994 1995 0,0687 0,0230 -0,0456 -0,0455 -0,0001
1995 1996 0,0670 0,0492 -0,0178 -0,0281 0,0103
1996 1998 0,0786 0,0434 -0,0352 -0,0256 -0,0096
1998 2000 0,0703 0,0177 -0,0526 -0,0507 -0,0019
2000 2001 0,0690 0,0389 -0,0302 -0,0325 0,0023
2001 2002 0,0731 0,0411 -0,0320 -0,0216 -0,0104
2002 2003 0,0648 0,0463 -0,0185 -0,0255 0,0070






indexes Growth effect Redistribution effect 
α = 0
2004 2005 0,0540 0,0315 -0,0226 -0,0137 -0,0088
α = 2
1994 1995 0,0372 0,0124 -0,0248 -0,0254 0,0005
1995 1996 0,0370 0,0269 -0,0101 -0,0154 0,0053
1996 1998 0,0428 0,0232 -0,0197 -0,0136 -0,0061
1998 2000 0,0371 0,0087 -0,0284 -0,0272 -0,0011
2000 2001 0,0372 0,0209 -0,0164 -0,0181 0,0017
2001 2002 0,0399 0,0225 -0,0173 -0,0119 -0,0055
2002 2003 0,0353 0,0243 -0,0110 -0,0140 0,0030
2003 2004 0,0359 0,0200 -0,0159 -0,0099 -0,0061
2004 2005 0,0281 0,0158 -0,0122 -0,0069 -0,0054
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1994 0,587 0,260 0,003 0,003 0,037 0,014 0,022 0,058 0,002 0,010
1995 0,594 0,253 0,003 0,003 0,028 0,011 0,028 0,060 0,002 0,010
1996 0,595 0,243 0,003 0,004 0,032 0,008 0,031 0,059 0,003 0,011
1998 0,547 0,298 0,003 0,008 0,031 0,011 0,030 0,054 0,004 0,008
2000 0,595 0,244 0,002 0,005 0,028 0,013 0,053 0,043 0,004 0,007
2001 0,619 0,237 0,001 0,006 0,023 0,009 0,045 0,044 0,002 0,006
2002 0,658 0,230 0,002 0,011 0,022 0,008 0,023 0,030 0,004 0,005
2003 0,637 0,233 0,002 0,010 0,023 0,010 0,034 0,037 0,003 0,003
2004 0,657 0,218 0,001 0,011 0,018 0,009 0,030 0,041 0,003 0,005
2005 0,671 0,211 0,001 0,014 0,017 0,008 0,030 0,033 0,003 0,004
α=1
1994 0,531 0,290 0,006 0,004 0,041 0,015 0,021 0,070 0,005 0,026
1995 0,532 0,289 0,006 0,006 0,033 0,012 0,025 0,072 0,004 0,027
1996 0,561 0,254 0,005 0,007 0,036 0,009 0,029 0,074 0,006 0,027
1998 0,513 0,313 0,005 0,012 0,038 0,011 0,028 0,066 0,006 0,015
2000 0,543 0,287 0,004 0,010 0,033 0,012 0,047 0,050 0,006 0,015
2001 0,560 0,278 0,004 0,013 0,029 0,010 0,043 0,053 0,005 0,012
2002 0,587 0,276 0,004 0,017 0,029 0,011 0,025 0,038 0,006 0,012
2003 0,568 0,276 0,003 0,023 0,030 0,011 0,036 0,044 0,006 0,010
2004 0,592 0,262 0,003 0,021 0,027 0,011 0,029 0,045 0,006 0,009
2005 0,600 0,248 0,004 0,034 0,025 0,010 0,032 0,038 0,006 0,007
α=2
1994 0,507 0,297 0,008 0,005 0,042 0,015 0,021 0,077 0,006 0,039
1995 0,507 0,295 0,008 0,008 0,036 0,013 0,025 0,078 0,005 0,040
1996 0,544 0,255 0,006 0,010 0,037 0,009 0,029 0,080 0,006 0,038
1998 0,500 0,314 0,006 0,017 0,040 0,011 0,028 0,072 0,007 0,020



















2001 0,534 0,288 0,005 0,018 0,032 0,010 0,044 0,058 0,006 0,018
2002 0,556 0,287 0,005 0,024 0,033 0,012 0,026 0,043 0,007 0,018
2003 0,538 0,288 0,005 0,033 0,033 0,011 0,038 0,047 0,007 0,014
2004 0,561 0,274 0,005 0,031 0,032 0,012 0,030 0,048 0,008 0,013
2005 0,566 0,259 0,005 0,047 0,030 0,011 0,034 0,042 0,007 0,010
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The impact that 
a 1% change in 
the respective 
income source 
will have on 
inequality
1994 0,043 -0,137 -0,002 -0,001 0,008 0,025 0,004 0,074 -0,001 -0,014
1995 0,048 -0,140 -0,001 -0,002 0,002 0,033 0,017 0,058 -0,001 -0,014
1996 0,025 -0,105 -0,001 -0,002 0,012 0,025 0,010 0,046 0,000 -0,010
1998 -0,006 -0,130 -0,001 -0,003 0,000 0,083 0,026 0,036 -0,001 -0,004
2000 0,030 -0,147 -0,001 -0,003 0,011 0,021 0,034 0,063 -0,001 -0,008
2001 0,046 -0,133 -0,001 -0,004 0,001 0,019 0,028 0,054 -0,001 -0,008
2002 0,048 -0,136 -0,001 -0,008 0,002 0,034 0,012 0,059 -0,002 -0,008
2003 -0,007 -0,128 -0,001 -0,010 0,009 0,052 0,016 0,076 -0,002 -0,006
2004 -0,027 -0,122 -0,001 -0,011 0,003 0,053 0,008 0,104 -0,003 -0,006
2005 0,023 -0,119 -0,001 -0,014 0,004 0,007 -0,004 0,112 -0,003 -0,005
The source 
Gini Gk
1994 0,601 0,707 0,952 0,989 0,945 0,986 0,973 0,938 0,986 0,771
1995 0,600 0,705 0,971 0,969 0,956 0,992 0,974 0,935 0,989 0,817
1996 0,609 0,748 0,976 0,968 0,961 0,994 0,969 0,938 0,989 0,873
1998 0,628 0,695 0,976 0,948 0,950 0,996 0,974 0,942 0,989 0,951
2000 0,602 0,691 0,971 0,922 0,951 0,988 0,955 0,961 0,989 0,926
2001 0,596 0,705 0,969 0,910 0,948 0,993 0,967 0,952 0,989 0,857
2002 0,572 0,700 0,971 0,885 0,947 0,994 0,976 0,963 0,986 0,861
2003 0,563 0,694 0,972 0,851 0,954 0,995 0,964 0,969 0,986 0,852
2004 0,534 0,710 0,974 0,855 0,946 0,997 0,970 0,974 0,982 0,867





























source k with 
the distribution 
of total income 
Rk
1994 0,839 0,123 0,259 0,383 0,593 0,838 0,559 0,803 0,245 0,037
1995 0,841 0,096 0,280 0,174 0,521 0,877 0,684 0,755 0,311 0,098
1996 0,839 0,193 0,261 0,331 0,643 0,894 0,635 0,739 0,471 0,218
1998 0,806 0,177 0,249 0,367 0,535 0,956 0,771 0,749 0,460 0,311
2000 0,816 0,058 0,299 0,244 0,607 0,826 0,719 0,794 0,365 0,076
2001 0,834 0,121 0,219 0,247 0,506 0,846 0,692 0,775 0,317 -0,104
2002 0,845 0,117 0,102 0,135 0,506 0,886 0,640 0,805 0,288 -0,029
2003 0,837 0,093 0,179 0,120 0,617 0,925 0,668 0,861 0,179 -0,048
2004 0,843 0,063 0,151 0,059 0,547 0,932 0,597 0,890 0,200 -0,017
2005 0,831 0,115 0,176 0,186 0,501 0,673 0,375 0,875 0,183 -0,048
The share of 
each income 
source in total 
income Sk
1994 0,583 0,168 0,004 0,003 0,043 0,033 0,026 0,122 0,003 0,015
1995 0,587 0,164 0,004 0,003 0,032 0,038 0,040 0,113 0,003 0,016
1996 0,595 0,149 0,003 0,005 0,046 0,031 0,040 0,110 0,004 0,017
1998 0,519 0,171 0,003 0,008 0,037 0,097 0,055 0,096 0,005 0,010
2000 0,570 0,161 0,003 0,007 0,048 0,028 0,072 0,099 0,004 0,009
2001 0,609 0,163 0,002 0,008 0,032 0,023 0,063 0,090 0,004 0,007
2002 0,629 0,167 0,002 0,011 0,034 0,035 0,030 0,082 0,004 0,007
2003 0,583 0,148 0,002 0,013 0,041 0,056 0,047 0,102 0,004 0,006
2004 0,596 0,134 0,002 0,012 0,033 0,055 0,034 0,124 0,004 0,005


























The share of 
each income 
source in total 
inequality
1994 0,626 0,031 0,002 0,003 0,052 0,059 0,030 0,196 0,002 0,001
1995 0,635 0,024 0,002 0,001 0,034 0,071 0,057 0,171 0,002 0,003
1996 0,621 0,044 0,001 0,003 0,058 0,057 0,050 0,156 0,004 0,006
1998 0,513 0,041 0,001 0,006 0,037 0,179 0,081 0,132 0,004 0,006
2000 0,601 0,014 0,002 0,003 0,059 0,049 0,106 0,161 0,003 0,001
2001 0,655 0,030 0,001 0,004 0,033 0,042 0,091 0,143 0,002 0,000
2002 0,676 0,030 0,000 0,003 0,037 0,068 0,042 0,141 0,003 0,000
2003 0,576 0,020 0,001 0,003 0,050 0,108 0,064 0,177 0,001 0,000
2004 0,569 0,013 0,001 0,001 0,037 0,109 0,041 0,228 0,002 0,000
2005 0,659 0,029 0,001 0,009 0,039 0,018 0,023 0,221 0,002 0,000
Table 2. Components of the Gini coefficient  of income 
Year Poverty line, rub. Characteristic 
All 
population The poor The rich Between
1994 62
Population share 11027 0,1832 0,8168  
The average income 183,75 37,99 216,44  
Gini coefficient 0,4700 0,2315 0,4111 0,1453
Share in overall Gini 1,0000 0,0034 0,6874 0,3092
1995 120
Population share 10161 0,1795 0,8205  
The average income 355,36 73,62 417  
Gini coefficient 0,4664 0,2373 0,4083 0,1423
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0034 0,6916 0,3051
73
Year Poverty line, rub. Characteristic 
All 
population The poor The rich Between
1996 158
Population share 9095 0,2079 0,7921  
The average income 483,12 97,02 584,46  
Gini coefficient 0,4903 0,2343 0,4243 0,1661
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0041 0,6569 0,3389
1998 206
Population share 9715 0,2021 0,7979  
The average income 654,10 132,08 786,29  
Gini coefficient 0,5122 0,2245 0,4561 0,1613
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0036 0,6815 0,3149
2000 455
Population share 10986 0,1858 0,8142  
The average income 1326,50 282,66 1564,68  
Gini coefficient 0,4664 0,2234 0,4073 0,1462
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0035 0,6829 0,3135
2001 667
Population share 12259 0,1957 0,8043  
The average income 1922,67 411,89 2290,25  
Gini coefficient 0,4622 0,2313 0,3978 0,1538
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0041 0,6632 0,3327
2002 875
Population share 12635 0,1767 0,8233  
The average income 2492,96 555,16 2908,72  
Gini coefficient 0,4489 0,2239 0,3919 0,1374
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0035 0,6904 0,3060
2003 1090
Population share 12755 0,1790 0,8210  
The average income 3348,32 681,45 3929,72  
Gini coefficient 0,4772 0,2248 0,4211 0,1426
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0031 0,6981 0,2988
2004 1315
Population share 12882 0,1570 0,8430  
The average income 4083,86 857,16 4684,99  
Gini coefficient 0,4717 0,2156 0,4251 0,1240
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0024 0,7347 0,2630
74
Year Poverty line, rub. Characteristic 
All 
population The poor The rich Between
2005 1733
Population share 12383 0,1601 0,8399  
The average income 4762,63 1108,18 5459,02  
Gini coefficient 0,4194 0,2131 0,3652 0,1228
Share in overall Gini 1 0,0030 0,7041 0,2929
75





Pension Scholarship Benefits Transfers 
Incomes 

























































































































































































































































































Pension Scholarship Benefits Transfers 
Incomes 

























































































































































































































































































Pension Scholarship Benefits Transfers 
Incomes 















































































































































1,05 0,65 0,49 0,77 1,02 1,18 1,04 1,25 0,75 -0,04
The note. Jackknife standard errors appear in parenthesis. The insignificant on 5 % level elasticities are marked by sign * (in the assumption of 
asymptotic normality distributions of estimations).
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0,583 0,168 0,004 0,003 0,043 0,033 0,026 0,122 0,003 0,015
0,495 0,340 0,006 0,006 0,023 0,003 0,014 0,047 0,006 0,060





0,587 0,164 0,004 0,003 0,032 0,038 0,040 0,113 0,003 0,016
0,469 0,343 0,005 0,008 0,030 0,006 0,012 0,062 0,003 0,061





0,595 0,149 0,003 0,005 0,046 0,031 0,040 0,110 0,004 0,017
0,602 0,217 0,004 0,006 0,029 0,004 0,014 0,074 0,005 0,046





0,519 0,171 0,003 0,008 0,037 0,097 0,055 0,096 0,005 0,010
0,540 0,290 0,009 0,011 0,037 0,003 0,017 0,062 0,006 0,027





0,571 0,161 0,003 0,007 0,048 0,028 0,072 0,099 0,005 0,009
0,492 0,334 0,005 0,010 0,043 0,002 0,028 0,046 0,008 0,034





0,609 0,163 0,002 0,008 0,032 0,023 0,063 0,090 0,004 0,007
0,500 0,333 0,006 0,013 0,033 0,005 0,030 0,035 0,004 0,042





0,629 0,167 0,002 0,011 0,034 0,035 0,030 0,082 0,005 0,007
0,503 0,346 0,007 0,022 0,029 0,009 0,017 0,027 0,004 0,038





0,583 0,148 0,002 0,013 0,041 0,056 0,047 0,102 0,004 0,006
0,513 0,327 0,004 0,032 0,033 0,006 0,023 0,028 0,009 0,027





0,596 0,134 0,002 0,012 0,034 0,055 0,034 0,124 0,004 0,005
0,542 0,303 0,004 0,025 0,036 0,006 0,018 0,023 0,012 0,031
























0,636 0,148 0,002 0,023 0,035 0,012 0,027 0,109 0,005 0,004
0,529 0,318 0,006 0,041 0,032 0,005 0,024 0,018 0,008 0,019
0,640 0,142 0,002 0,022 0,035 0,012 0,027 0,113 0,005 0,004
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Appendix 4
Shapley decomposition (from paper (Shorrocks, 1999)).
Let I represent an aggregate statistical indicator, such as the overall level of poverty or in­
equality, and let  Xk, { }, 1,2,...,k K K m=О denote a set of contributory factors which together account 
for the value of I:
1 2( , ,..., )mI f X X X= ,                                                       (1)
where f(∙) is a suitable aggregator function representing the underlying model.
The indicator I will represent the overall level of poverty or inequality in the population, or 
the change in poverty over time. The factor Xk may refer to a conventional scalar or vector variable.
In what follows, we imagine scenarios in which some or all of the factors are eliminated, and 
use F(S) to signify the value that I take when the factors Xk, k∉S,  have been dropped. As each of 
the factors is either present or absent, it is convenient to characterize the model structure ,K F , in 
terms  of  the  set  of  factors  (or,  more  accurately,  «factor  indices»)  K, and  the  function
{ }: |F S S K →Н Ў . Since that the set of factors completely accounts for  I, it will also be conve­
nient to assume throughout that ( )0 0F = : in other words, that I is zero when all the factors are re­
moved.
A decomposition ,K F  is a set of real values Ck, k KО , indicating the contribution of each 
of the factors. A decomposition rule is a function which yields a set of factor contributions 
( , ),k kC C K F k K= О ,                                                (2)
for any possible model ,K F .
In seeking to construct a decomposition rule, several desiderata come to mind. First, that it 
should be symmetric (or anonymous) in the sense that the contribution assigned to any given factor 
should not depend on the way in which the factors are labeled or listed. Secondly, that the decom­
position should be exact (and additive), so that 
( , ) ( )k
k K
C K F F K
О
=е , for all ,K F .                                       (3)
When condition (3) is satisfied  it is meaningful to speak of the proportion of observed in­
equality or poverty attributable to factor k.
It is also desirable that the contributions of the factors can be interpreted in an intuitively ap­
pealing way. In this respect, the most natural candidate is the rule which equates the contribution of 
each factor to its (first round) marginal impact
{ }( , ) ( ) ( \ ), .kM K F F K F K k k K= − О                                       (4)
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A second possibility is to consider the marginal impact of each of the factors when they are 
eliminated in sequence. Let 1 2( , ,..., )mσ = σ σ σ  indicate the order in which the factors are removed, 
and let { }( , ) |r iS i rσ σ = σ >  be the set of factors that remain after factor σr has been eliminated. 
Then the marginal impacts are given by
( ( , ) { }) ( ( , )) ( ( , )),k kF S k k F S k F S k k KC
σ
= ∆σ − σ σ О= U ,                          (5)
where
{ } { }( ) ( ) ( ), \k F S F S k F S S K k∆ −є НU                                 (6)
is the marginal effect of adding factor k to the set S. Using the fact that { }1 1( , ) ( , )r r rS S + +σ σ = σ σ σU  
for 1,2,..., 1r m= − , we deduce
[ ]
1 1
( ( , ) { }) ( ( , ))
r
m m
k r r r
k K r r
C C F S F Sσ σσ
= =О
= = σ σ σ − σ σ =е е е U
{ }1 1( ( , ) ) ( ( , )) ( ) ( ) ( ).mF S F S F K F F K= σ σ σ − σ σ = − =ЖU                          (7)
The decomposition (5) is therefore exact. However, the value of the contribution assigned to 
any given factor depends on the order in which the factors appear in the elimination sequence σ, so 
the factors are not treated symmetrically.  This «path dependence» problem may be remedied by 
considering the m! possible elimination sequences, denoted here by the set Σ, and by computing the 
expected value of kC
σ  when the sequences in Σ are chosen at random. This yields the decomposi­
tion rule CS given by
1 1( , ) ( ( , ))
! !
S
k k kC K F C F S km m
σ
σ σОе Ое
= = ∆ σ =е е
( , )
1 1
0 \{ } 0 \{ }
1 ( 1 )! !( ) ( )
! !
S k SS s S s
m m
k k
s S K k s S K k




= σ =Н Ое Н
− −
= ∆ = ∆е е е е е                      (8)
Using ( , 1) ( 1 )! !/ !s m m s s mpi − = − −  to indicate the relevant probability, equation (8) is ex­
pressed more succinctly as 
\{ }\{ }
( , ) ( , \{ } ) ( ) ( ),ESk k kS K kS K k
C K F S K k F S F S k K
НН
= pi ∆ = ∆ Ое ,                (9)
where ES LН  – is the expectation taken with respect to the subsets of L.
From (7) it is clear that СS is an exact decomposition rule, and also one which treats the fac­
tors symmetrically. Furthermore, the contributions can be interpreted as the expected marginal im­
pact of each factor when the expectation is taken over all the possible elimination paths. Expression 
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(8) corresponds to the Shapley value for the cooperative game in which «output» or «surplus» F(K) 
is shared amongst the set of «inputs» or «agents» K. The formula (8) is the Shapley decomposition 
rule. 
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